Introduction

In the aftermath of the June 2023 Wagner Rebellion and the death of its leader Yevgeny Prigozhin two months later, a considerable amount of attention has been devoted to the Russian private military company (PMC).  Scholarly analyses and think tank reports have been joined in discourse by extensive global media coverage dissecting Wagner’s connections to the Russian intelligence agencies, the background and personal ambitions of Prigozhin, and the brutal violence committed by its operatives. What has often been overlooked, however, is arguably the most important question: Was Wagner a success?

This article seeks to address the question by examining whether Wagner was an effective tool for advancing the Kremlin’s foreign policy objectives. The PMC’s value as an instrument of foreign policy can be assessed in two key areas: its role in expanding and consolidating Russian geopolitical influence in strategic regions, and its function in economic imperialism and resource extraction to benefit Russian interests.

A Brief History of Wagner 

Wagner emerged at a time when Russia was searching for innovative methods to pursue its foreign policy objectives. Russia is best described as an “adhocracy” which operates pragmatically and encourages its agents to seize upon opportunities through innovative forms of disruption. Wagner represents precisely that: an innovative, decentralised form of disruption, created to seize on opportunities. 

First deployed in 2014 to Ukraine at a time when Moscow needed a way to fight a covert war, Wagner proved itself an effective asset by assisting in the annexation of the Crimean peninsula, and through their assistance to the separatist forces in Eastern Ukraine. The group was promptly adopted as “frontline agents of Russian strategy”, the keystone of Russian hybrid warfare. The Kremlin had found a new tool to be weaponised globally.

As a group, Wagner finds its origins in the Slavonic Corps PMC, which had been deployed to Syria in 2013 but failed in their first serious military engagement and was quickly disbanded. In 2014, Lt. Col. Dmitrii Utkin, a veteran of the Chechen wars, former GRU special forces, Spetsnaz commander, and Slavonic Corps operative in Syria, appeared in the Donbas as the leader of a new organisation, Wagner. The PMC was named after Utkin’s call sign, ‘Wagner’, allegedly due to his love of the German composer Richard Wagner, and his fascination with Nazi Germany.

A Flexible, Inexpensive, and Deniable Asset

One of Wagner’s key strengths was flexibility. In contrast to the sluggish, bureaucratic and overstretched Russian state, with its competing departments, Wagner proved to be a highly versatile group, able to adapt itself to the various situations and circumstances of its missions. The ease with which Wagner could be deployed offered the Kremlin a readily available solution to project force and swiftly take advantage of geopolitical outbreaks, and at a far lower cost than sending the military. Indeed, the annual cost of maintaining the total Russian PMC presence in Syria was estimated to have been about half as much as the official military maintenance for Syrian operations.

Utilising PMCs in its foreign adventuring allows Russia to systematically control the flow of information regarding casualties. Deploying Russian soldiers to areas such as Syria and Libya is unpopular, and the potential public backlash of large Russian fatalities in lands thousands of miles from home is an event Moscow would like to avoid. 

Again, Wagner provided a solution. Mercenary deaths do not have the same effect on the Russian public as images of regular soldiers dying abroad, and the state typically has not acknowledged PMC casualties as official deaths. Wagner’s losses were mostly hidden from the public, and this provided cover for disastrous loss of life, such as when 300 Wagner operatives were killed by U.S. air strikes in 2018 following an assault on U.S. and allied positions to capture an installation near Deir ez-Zur in Syria.

Utilising Wagner for its foreign operations also enabled Moscow to, in theory, minimize risks to its diplomatic reputation. As an ostensibly private enterprise, Wagner provided deniability for high-risk operations, such as the aforementioned assault on Deiz ez-Zur. Had the assault succeeded, Moscow would have secured a valuable facility. Its failure, however, allowed Russia to deflect blame. 

Accusations of human rights abuses and indiscriminate killings meanwhile have marred Wagner’s military operations. Violence targeting civilians accounted for 52% of Wagner’s involvement in political violence in the Central African Republic (CAR), and a staggering 71% in Mali. Wagner’s reputation for “extreme violence” has benefitted the Kremlin, which was able to use the group to “take the fall” for its atrocities.

Wagner as a Tool of Geopolitical Expansion 

At a time when Russia faced economic decline and increasing isolation from international society, Wagner offered Moscow a way to compete with the West for influence. In Prigozhin’s PMC, Moscow found a tool that can provide it with two of its key foreign policy goals: challenge the West in regions where it desires to expand its sphere of influence at the expense of its global rivals, and curry friendly relations, political support, and trading partnerships with states to counterbalance its international isolation. 

Whether acting as a covert military force, a regime security provider, or a facilitator of resource extraction, Wagner’s flexibility allowed it to serve as a versatile instrument of Russian foreign policy. It is useful to broadly categorise Wagner’s contracts into two primary types of deployment: “Substitute for the Russian Army” and “Security Export”. The first refers to operations in which the group acted as a proxy force, performing military functions that allowed the Kremlin to achieve strategic goals without committing state forces, and the second to providing security services to foreign governments in exchange for political influence or economic gains.

Wagner’s Success as a Russian Army Substitute

In Syria and Libya Wagner acted as a proxy military force, to support the Kremlin’s overall grand strategy, without risking the heavy financial and public relations costs of widescale regular deployments.

Wagner deployed to Syria in 2015 to defend the Assad government from the Islamic State and other opponents and counter U.S. efforts to project power.  Initially acting as a shock force, Wagner played an increasingly direct role in combat operations during the civil war, and the experience served as an “excellent laboratory” to test out Moscow’s PMC strategy. 

Despite the widely reported disaster at Deir ez-Zor and the eventual collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024, the group’s Syria deployments were effective. Wagner’s operatives were key in turning the tide of the war in its early days, and the group played a crucial role in capturing and then holding targets of major importance to the Kremlin. 

The Syria model was followed in Libya. Moscow saw an opportunity to exploit the post-Gaddafi instability and expand Russian influence in the power vacuum, whilst checking Western interests. Wagner was again key in advancing Russia’s geopolitical and foreign policy interests and acted as the primary arm of the Kremlin’s objectives to advance Russian foreign policy, military, and economic interests in the country. At the forefront of Russia’s ground support for General Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan National Army, the group conducted numerous offensives vital to Haftar’s war, including the 2019 assault on the UN-backed Government of National Accord in Tripoli. 

In both Syria and Libya, Wagner proved crucial to Moscow’s ability to project itself as a major power in the region, counter Western geostrategic interests, and gain strategic footholds in the Middle East and North Africa, as well as strengthen its position in the Mediterranean and Africa in general.

Wagner as a Security Export

Across Sub-Saharan Africa, Wagner has been used as a “regime survival package” for states suffering instability, nation-building failures, and armed uprisings, deployed as a force to bolster governments, reclaim rebel territory, disseminate propaganda, and train local forces.

Wagner has been used to insert Moscow into regions of interest, namely the Sahel, where, anti-Western sentiment has been growing due to apathy from Western policymakers and failures of existing Western actors to address existing problems. 

France, the traditional European power in the region, has suffered numerous setbacks in its Africa policy, which allowed Russia to take advantage. In Mali, for example, the French began pro-regime military interventions in 2013. However, military coups in 2021 and 2022, growing anti-colonial resentment, and the failure of anti-rebel operations led to the withdrawal of French forces in 2022. Moscow, happy to fill the void and usurp France’s position in the Sahel, deployed Wagner to provide training and support to the Malian military and protect strategic assets and infrastructure. 

In November 2023, Wagner helped retake Kidal, a rebel stronghold held for nearly a decade. The group’s military success was fortified by propaganda, typically detailing French peacekeeping forces as “bad” and “representing coloniser forces” while “non-coloniser” Wagner was “good”. As a result, Mali witnessed a surge of pro-Russian and pro-Wagner popularity: 98% of polled Malians support Mali-Russia cooperation.

Wagner’s utility as a tool for countering Western influence is further evident in its operations in Sudan. In 2017, Sudanese leader Omar al-Bashir visited Russia to lobby the Kremlin to protect his country from “aggressive U.S. actions”, declaring that Sudan could be Russia’s “key to Africa”. 

Wagner arrived in Sudan to provide military and political support to al-Bashir but remained after the April 2019 coup removed the President from power. Rather than loyally staking Moscow’s fortunes with the government that brought them in, Wagner remained flexible and opportunistic during the transition. The primary strategic objective in Sudan was establishing a Red Sea naval base – the regime in question did not particularly matter. 

Wagner then backed the 2021 coup, which brought an even more pro-Russian government into power. 

Since then, Sudan has gained increased importance for Russia. In the ongoing political conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Force (RSF) paramilitary group, Moscow has been accused of funding and arming both sides, with Wagner remnants continuing to supply arms to the RSF through late 2024, highlighting the Kremlin’s commitment to playing both sides to secure its strategic interests. 

Moscow has also maintained diplomatic ties with both the SAF and RSF: the commander of the RSF, Hamdan Dagalo, the supposed “most powerful person in Sudan” led a delegation to Moscow to “advance relations” between the two countries the day before Russia invaded Ukraine, whilst SAF/Government officials agreed to finally grant Russia their long desired Red Sea Naval base in February 2025.

Wagner’s operations in the Central African Republic stand out as a significant foreign policy success for the Kremlin. Prigozhin played a key role in peace negotiations between the government and fourteen armed groups, resulting in the 2019 Khartoum Agreement. Although the deal collapsed amid the breakdown of peace in the lead-up to the 2020 Presidential elections, it maintained international support and handed Moscow a rare diplomatic victory on the global stage. 

Wagner’s post-breakdown counteroffensive against the rebel forces brought most rebel strongholds under central control, effectively consolidating the regime. Ever since the country has been a close ally and has been labelled “ground zero for Russian influence in Central Africa”.

The effectiveness of Wagner as a tool for exchanging security for political support is evident. Moscow gained partners in key regions during a period of isolation, which became even more significant in the aftermath of its invasion of Ukraine. States in which Wagner operated have typically refrained from condemning Russia: The CAR has consistently voted against anti-Russian resolutions and alongside Sudan and Mozambique abstained from the vote on Russia ceasing its military operations and ending the war. Mali and Syria, meanwhile, outright rejected the resolution. 

Wagner as a tool of Economic Imperialism and Resource Extraction

By purely economic metrics, Wagner was an unqualified success. The group’s dealings and contracts allowed itself a degree of self-sustainability and brought resources into Russia, serving as a strategic tool to expand trade relations, and acting as a battering ram for Moscow’s penetration into global markets.

In return for offering regime security protection, Wagner frequently secured control over valuable natural resources. In Syria, Wagner was promised 25% of all profits from the gas and oil fields they recovered. Military support in Libya was exchanged for “huge concessions” from General Haftar in the oil, transportation, construction, and defence sectors. In June 2020, they took control of Sharara, the country’s largest oil field, and later fortified all the roads from the Sharara area leading to the port in Sirte to ensure exports would continue uninterrupted.

The Sudanese government signed a gold mining contract with Prigozhin-owned company M-Invest in November 2017, and Wagner arrived shortly afterwards to train the Sudanese security forces and “secure goldmines”. Wagner’s presence in the CAR was so closely tied to securing access to resources that even the Khartoum Agreement provided Prigozhin with lucrative mining concessions. Wagner’s economic activity in the country included the typical gold and diamond extraction but also featured ventures into the forestry, alcohol and coffee industries. The group was so embedded in the CAR, that some have even speculated that the delay in the Kremlin taking action against Prigozhin after the mutiny was due to the need to audit and assess Wagner’s operations and network in the country before usurping control over it. 

The exploitation of natural resources provided direct funds to Wagner’s global network, allowing the group to expand its operations in Africa, Ukraine, and elsewhere. The gold extracted likely entered illicit gold markets and was used in gold laundering schemes. Gold can be physically moved around the world outside of digital financial networks, and its origins are notoriously difficult to trace, which allows Moscow to generate profits in illicit sales, fund military operations or even compensate sanctioned Russian oligarchs for their losses. 

Trade in general between Russia and Africa has grown by over 400% in the last decade, reaching a record $24.5 billion by the end of 2024. In particular, the presence of Wagner in Africa played a pivotal role in the growth of Russian arms exports to the continent in the last decade, allowing Moscow to funnel arms to the CAR, Sudan, Mali, and Libya. Wagner’s efforts, including transferring arms to states under UN arms embargoes, contributed to Russia overtaking China as the leading weapons supplier to Africa over the 2018-2022 period with its imports making up 40% of African arms imports.

Drawbacks of a Semi-Autonomous Military Force

Wagner’s autonomy occasionally posed significant challenges to Russian foreign policy, particularly when Prigozhin determined that the risks outweighed the benefits of the contract on offer. A notable example is Wagner’s deployment to Mozambique’s northern Cabo Delgado province in September 2019, where it was tasked with conducting counterinsurgency operations against Islamist militants. The group was ill-prepared for the mission or combat in the bush and struggled to coordinate with regime forces. The usually adaptable group proved ineffective in fighting in the terrain and was repeatedly beset by ambushes. 

After suffering high casualties – including an alleged beheading of a Wagner operative following an ambush – Prigozhin ordered a retreat south in November, reportedly angering then-Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu. Shoigu feared the withdrawal would damage Russia’s reputation and undermine broader ambitions for deeper ties with Mozambique. Ultimately the group was replaced by the South African PMC Dyck Advisory Group in April of that year.

The personal animosity between Prigozhin and Shoigu also heavily affected Russia’s ability to rely on Wagner, and Wagner’s willingness to “do the dirty work” for the Kremlin. In one notable case, Shoigu cancelled Wagner’s contract in March 2016 following the recapture of Palmyra from ISIS, only to reissue weapons to Wagner following the city falling again in December. Prigozhin, however, had been infuriated by comments denigrating Wagner’s role in the fighting made by General Aleksandr Dvornikov and sent his men back to camp, only rejoining the conflict under great pressure. Not only did this expose the fragility of Wagner’s integration into Russia’s military strategy but it also highlighted the challenges of relying on a semi-autonomous military force driven by competing agendas. 

Wagner’s autonomy often hurt relations with its client state as well. The Assad regime was unhappy with the group’s tendency not to share intelligence with the government regarding its actions and for allegedly recruiting Syrians and deploying them in Libya. Assad was also allegedly “upset” over Wagner’s carelessness regarding civilian deaths and its rampant committing of crime. Even in the CAR, the widespread anger over rape and torture committed by operatives strained the regime’s faith in Wagner.

Conclusion

Moscow’s use of Wagner significantly impacted the growth of Russian influence in regions the Kremlin targeted as strategic counterweights against the West. Wagner’s operations were instrumental in Russia’s resurgence as a key player, first in the Middle East and later in Africa, distinguishing its approach and solidifying its presence.

Regimes that acquired Wagner’s services frequently align themselves with Russia on the global stage, even refusing to condemn Moscow in the UN over its war in Ukraine. Through dealing with authoritarian regimes and weak states, Moscow has clearly gained influence and a form of soft power through its willingness to support corrupt and isolated governments without preaching to them about their human rights record. 

There were failures, as in Mozambique, and drawbacks. Prigozhin’s political ambitions and the vitriol between Wagner and the MoD gradually escalated to mutiny during the war in Ukraine, but Wagner must be remembered as a successful experiment. The greatest endorsement of this argument is the fact that the Kremlin has rebranded the group under the “Africa Corps” moniker, albeit with far greater state oversight and control to prevent any sort of would-be Prigozhin from challenging the state once again.

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Brock Salvatore Cullen-Irace is an intelligence analyst based between London and Brussels, who is currently a Political Commentator for Europinion. He has a BA in Politics from Aberystwyth University and an MA in Violence, Terrorism, and Security from Queen’s University Belfast.