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The year 2021 marks our fifth birthday. The end of March always brings us emotions because we remember how it all started back in 2016. Significant transformations have happened since then. The COVID-19 pandemic has changed the world we used to know, but it has also helped us rethink our path.

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Below you shall read several memorable texts from young and promising scholars, and we could not be happier that they decided to publish their materials in our journal. All the texts in this issue reflect some of the challenges facing the world as we know it.

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Apartheid South Africa's 'Total Strategy': A Policy Analysis

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Introduction

Apartheid South Africa's 'Total Strategy' was the reaction to a multitude of factors and influences coming to the fore, both domestically and internationally, that were far beyond the scope of the Apartheid regime to control. They ranged from international isolation to domestic political conflict with various liberation movements and the brutal enforcement of a race-based societal model. All these pressures factored into the Apartheid states' decision in the late 1970's to implement a far reaching and enveloping policy that became known as 'Total Strategy'.

In particular, four key components of the strategy were developed in order to counter what were perceived as the most important domestic issues facing the regime. This report will take a three-fold approach in its search to explain and analyze the four key parts of the Apartheid states' 'Total Strategy' policy. Firstly, it will describe the 'Total National Strategy' policy and its four key components, as well as the relevant historical context that brought about its existence. The second argument will analyze the policy, including why it was adopted, as well as the main factors and key persons involved throughout that helped shape the policy and decision-making process. Finally, this essay will evaluate the shortcomings of the policy, as well as any potential alternatives.

Historical and Political Context

In analyzing South Africa's 'Total Strategy' it is imperative to mention the historical context in which said strategy emerged from. 'Total Strategy' is the result of a plethora of factors, both domestically and internationally, all pressing down on the Apartheid regime within a relatively short period of time during the 1970's. Abroad, exclusion and ostracization by the international community resulted in South Africa being left incredibly isolated turning it into an increasingly volatile state, which was incredibly sensitive to any developments

that compromised its national security objectives. It compounded South Africa's regional insecurities, and the regime sought the 'Total Strategy' as the best possible tool to address them. That was the first factor that influenced the formulation of 'Total Strategy'. Throughout the 1970's South Africa's cordon sanitaire (a revealing term describing the French containment foreign policy in Europe after World War I) of Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique steadily fell apart. Portugal withdrew from its colonies in 1974 and Rhodesia remained in a state of conflict until 1979 when Ian Smith's government was replaced by Robert Mugabe. It was a disaster for the Apartheid security apparatus as previously the Portuguese colonies and Rhodesia had aided South Africa in destroying Black liberation movement bases in the region forcing their fighters to disperse further north to states such as Zambia or Tanzania, thus making it harder for them to coordinate their actions and infiltrate South Africa. Thus, with governments in Zimbabwe and Mozambique that aided the liberation movements and were sympathetic to the plight of Black South Africans at the border, the Apartheid regime felt increasingly pressed to respond brutally to any perceived insurrection within its borders.

Increase in domestic resistance to Apartheid was another contributing factor in the formulation of 'Total Strategy', culminating in the Soweto Riots - a demonstration in 1976 by Black schoolchildren over the introduction of Afrikaans as the medium language in local schools. The response from the regime was swift and brutal, an estimate of between 180 to over 700 people were killed over the two days of rioting, mostly by the police. This was a watershed moment for the Apartheid state, as it began to not distinguish between every riot, protest and direct action taken against it and viewed them all as part of a wider plan to topple the regime by enemy forces. It is from this context that then Prime Minister P.W. Botha came to view that there was a so-called 'Total Onslaught' campaign being undertaken against the Apartheid state, both within South Africa and internationally. This 'Onslaught' was a claim that South Africa was under a coordinated assault from foreign entities seeking to destroy the state. As has been stated, the period of 1975-78 during which Botha rose to power was characterized by numerous security concerns and issues that evolved at an incredibly fast pace. Since his promotion to Minister of Defense in 1966 until his appointment as Prime Minister in 1978, Botha had increasingly sought to centralize and consolidate his own political power, as well as the power of the military. This had resulted in the creation of a state run by the so-called 'securocrats'. Botha had also been quoted in Parliament on several occasions during the twilight years of the John Vorster administration calling for the need to adopt a 'Total Strategy' to counter the increasing threats South Africa was facing at home and abroad. Indeed, once assuming the role of Prime Minister, Botha immediately set about the process of implementing such an idea through enunciating a '12 Point Plan' to carry out the aims of the 'Total Strategy' in 1979.

It should be noted however, that Botha was not the originator of the 'Total Strategy' notion. The first public mention of the need for a 'Total Strategy' was by General Charles Fraser, Chief of the Army from 1966 to 1967 who emphasized that "counter-insurgency must be a carefully coordinated system of actions - political, economic, administrative,

psychological, police and military". These aspects were eventually all core components of the 'Total Strategy' policy later.

Characteristics of the 'Total Strategy'

Eventually, it was the product of numerous security and national pressures all weighing down upon the Apartheid regime in a short time span. Some of the main factors involved were the collapse of South Africa's regional allies: Rhodesia and the Portuguese Empire, as well as an increase in domestic violence and resistance towards the Apartheid state such as the Soweto Riots. Whilst the notion of a 'Total Strategy' was first devised by General Fraser, its main supporter and backer was Botha, who sought to find an efficient all-in-one solution to the plethora of pressures bearing down upon the Apartheid regime. These pressures were labelled as a 'Total Onslaught': a perceived coordinated attack by many hostile elements, domestically and internationally, that sought the destruction of Apartheid South Africa. Therefore, in this sense 'Total Strategy' was defined as a "comprehensive plan to utilize all the means available to the state according to an integrated pattern in order to achieve the national aims within the framework of specific policies."

Such a grand strategy needed complicated coordination between economic, social, political and security policies hence, a '12-point plan' was developed to put the 'Total Strategy' policy into practice and prevent the perceived 'onslaught'. The first six points all deal with what are essentially domestic political matters, more specifically race relations and they rely on four central components that defined the approach the program would take. Each of these components of 'Total Strategy' were all designed to confront a specific major perceived segment of the 'Total Onslaught'. It was hoped by the Apartheid leadership that by breaking down and addressing the main perceived segments of the 'Total Onslaught' individually, rather than an overarching approach to the whole issue, that the 'Total Strategy' would provide a tailored solution to South Africa's security concerns.

The first article of 'Total Strategy' involved the resolving of the many structural problems, such as the need to create a Black middle-class population. However, it refused to rescind work related laws that kept Black people in poverty, facing the Apartheid system that had developed throughout the 1970's as well as against "Black resistance which had developed as a result." This component went hand in hand with the wide scale policy of reformation President Botha was pursuing at the same time. He had recognized that Apartheid was too rigid a system to survive and, hence, this component initially sought to 'improve' or even do away with several infamous Apartheid laws that had come to represent, in the eyes of the international community, the entire system of Apartheid. These included the Mixed Marriages Act (which banned persons of different races from marrying within South Africa) and section 16 of the Immorality Act (which banned sex between Whites and non-Whites). Although, ultimately, pressure from more extreme

elements within the Apartheid regime prevented either of these laws being completely removed and instead only minimal concessions were given.

The second component comprised engaging with sectors of South African society that had previously been considered hostile elements towards the National Party in its struggle against the 'Total Onslaught'. It was targeted at the White, English-speaking segment of the population, given the huge influence they had over areas such as business and the media. There had long been a division at every level of White society between the English-speakers, who tended to be more liberal, urban and tolerant, and the Afrikaners, who were historically an insular, conservative and very rural based populace. This part of 'Total Strategy' thus sought to bridge the divide between the two groups and present a unified White front in order to confront increasing pressure to end Apartheid both domestically and abroad. Ultimately, however, this component did not have much success as the regime made minimal headway in swaying the anglophone media and, business-wise, a wave of disinvestment occurred throughout the 1980's which only accentuated South Africa's economic problems.

The third component was the co-opting of an entire class of 'insiders' to be used as a buffer against an alleged mass of 'outsiders' that threatened the regime. These alleged 'outsiders' ranged from 'communists' to 'terrorists' but, in reality, were normally various Black liberation movements. The 'insiders' were to be drawn primarily through the creation of a new Black middle-class population. They would then act as a political buffer for the regime in order for it to gain time and space to further develop relevant policies to counter these outsiders. Ultimately, this failed due to the inability of the regime to create a visible and sustainable Black middle-class population, given the many restrictions and laws that hindered precisely such development.

The fourth and final component of 'Total Strategy' involved a reorganization and rationalization of the state and its apparatus, in order to ensure a more streamlined, efficient and rigorous bureaucracy that would be able to carry out the needs of the state with brutal efficiency. Here, especially, major work was needed. In the final years of the John Vorster administration there had been large amounts of bureaucratic infighting between various sections of the South African government. Chief amongst these was the conflict between the Bureau of State Security and the Directorate of Military Intelligence over the direction of South Africa's security policy. Botha sought to clearly establish operational boundaries between the various agencies as well as slim down the ever-growing amount of government departments. In reality, he paved the way for greater control of the government by 'securocrats', defined by Jane Duncan as "officials located in the security establishment that have the power to influence government policy in their favor." This resulted in the increased militarization of the state which, in turn, led to increasingly heavy-handed security operations on the various liberation movements and people of South Africa.

Evaluation of Apartheid South Africa's 'Total Strategy' Policy

One of the most critical issues regarding South Africa's four central components of 'Total Strategy' was that they were embedded in the presupposition that the majority of the South Africa's Black population was either neutral towards, or not supportive of, the various liberation movements engaged in actions against the Apartheid government, and that only a minority of South Africa's Black population were involved in these movements. Indeed, whilst most of it did not take part in any direct action against the Apartheid state, the vast majority of the population were sympathetic to the liberation movements. This central, and false, line of thought within the Apartheid state thus bled into two major flaws that crippled the effectiveness of the domestic aspects of 'Total Strategy' over the 15 years it endured.

Firstly, despite the acknowledgement by the Apartheid security apparatus that counter-insurgency operations were '80% political and 20% military', the SADF (South Africa Defense Force) and SAP (South Africa Police) were either unable or unwilling to approach resistance to the state in any form other than a heavy-handed military and security approach. Indeed, the reality more often than not was "80% military and 20% political." This brutal military-security approach was taken in part because of the belief that only a small part of the South Africans was in support of the various liberation movements. Hence, when undertaking operations, the security and military apparatus were often given a very wide legal scope in which to carry out their operations, as those that they were combatting were branded as terrorists or enemies of the state. This resulted in brutal and repressive tactics being employed by the security and military apparatus in combating the liberation organizations, and human rights of ordinary citizens were often blatantly ignored. It should be noted however that it was not merely due to the Apartheid regime sanctioning these forms of operations, which resulted in such brutality occurring. Many within the security and, to a lesser extent, the military establishments were ardent supporters of the Apartheid regime and what it stood for, especially given that both establishments held huge sway over the state under Apartheid during the period of 'Total Strategy'. This ultimately resulted in a steady increase in hostilities, and significant decrease in race relations, over the entire period of 'Total Strategy' spanning from 1978 until 1994.

Secondly, the 'Total Strategy' policy could not (albeit in the minds of its implementers it attempted to) answer the 'national political question' of how to ensure the exclusion of the Black population from political participation. This question demanded that the regime seek an alternative policy, which the majority of the population would accept, to that offered by the various Black liberation movements, who sought the complete removal of the Apartheid system. However, no viable political alternative was ever properly considered, as any solution that maintained Apartheid in any form would have led to further opposition by the majority of South Africa's population. This opposition had been steadily growing throughout the 1970's, as seen in events such as the Soweto Riots.

As a result of the unwillingness of the regime to recognize that including the Black population in the political process was vital in resolving the 'Total Onslaught' within South Africa; the first, second and third components of South Africa's domestic 'Total Strategy' policy (restructuring Apartheid system, reaching out to anglophone Whites and creation of a Black middle class supportive of the state) were all jeopardized. The Apartheid regime was unable (and unwilling) to structurally reform itself to appeal to the majority of the South African population, given that the only acceptable method to do this involved ending its own existence. It also alienated many White anglophones through not being able to offer a more tolerant and inclusive political system and failed to remove major obstacles preventing Black South Africans from forming part of the middle class, which resulted in the lack of a significant Black populace supportive of the state. Whilst the Apartheid regime did manage to structurally reorganize itself, this was mostly done to enhance the efficiency of security and military operations, as well as give the securocrats more sway over the state. Hence, due to the stark ideological contrasts between the Apartheid regime and the vast majority of the South African populace, as well as the regime's willingness to enforce its ideology through repressive tactics, alternate policies the government could have successfully pursued were hard to envisage by the state. One attempted policy was the formation of the Tricameral Parliament - a superficial attempt at giving Indians and Colored's voting rights and representation in government through the creation of their own separates houses in order to appease them and build a diverse support base for the government. However, Whites still held the majority of power within these new structures, ensuring the status quo stability.

Since the Apartheid regime's four key domestic components of 'Total Strategy' policy were based on the false presupposition that the vast majority of South Africa's Black populace were indifferent to the various liberation movements; this line of thinking spawned two crucial flaws, which hindered the efficacy of 'Total Strategy'. Firstly, 'Total Strategy' failed, in part, due to the heavy-handed security apparatus. Secondly, the unwillingness of the Apartheid regime to include the Black population in any meaningful political participation hindered most of the domestic components of 'Total Strategy'. Hence, by refusing to permit the majority of South Africans into the political process the regime had already placed itself in a situation where it had merely bought more time for itself through the use of heavy-handed security operations. Yet, this time was not used to attempt any major reforms or pursue other policies due to the ideological commitment to Apartheid by the regime.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this report on Apartheid South Africa's 'Total Strategy' policy has demonstrated three points. Firstly, it has described the 'Total Strategy' policy, with regards to the four key domestic components, as well as what their outcomes were. Secondly, it has also sought to analyze the 'Total Strategy' policy and its origins by demonstrating the main factors and key persons involved in relation to its domestic components. The factors ranged from regional insecurities, such as the collapse of the Portuguese Empire and the fall of Rhodesia, to increased domestic resistance, as seen in the Soweto Riots. The key persons involved in the whole process were Botha and General Fraser. Whilst Fraser was primarily responsible for roughly outlining the future for South African counterinsurgency policy during the late 1960's, it was Botha who had called and pushed for a concrete version of this policy. Indeed, Botha almost immediately sought to put 'Total Strategy' into practice following his ascension to the Prime Minister position.

Finally, this report has evaluated the overall strengths and weaknesses of the 'Total Strategy' policy, with regards to the four key domestic components. It has found that, ultimately, they were not enough to resolve the numerous problems and threats, perceived or otherwise, against the regime. Whilst the efficiency and brutality of the Botha regime did manage to extend the existence of the Apartheid system through its heavy-handed combination of military power and legislation, it was not able to sufficiently confront any of the issues that were supposed to be addressed by the four key domestic components of the 'Total Strategy'.

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Russia and China: Two Case Studies in International Revisionism

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About the author

Brock is a First-Class Honours Graduate of Politics, BA from Aberystwyth University, and the recipient of several academic awards. My primary research interests are emerging powers and their impact on international relations.

The post-Cold War era of international politics has largely been defined by the primacy of the United States. The collapse of the Soviet Union, America's main adversary and ideological rival, gave way to an international system dominated not by multilateral consensus but by the will of the United States. The 'Liberal International Order', the rules-based system of international organization established following the Second World War, which had largely been created through American initiative, and promoted American-aligned ideals, such as liberal democracy, open markets, and the creation of international institutions such as the United Nations, had lost its greatest challenger, and America's pre-eminent position seemed entrenched. American unipolarity was never universally embraced, however, and in the aftermath of its invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the 2008 Financial Crisis, in particular, the legitimacy of American leadership has declined, and the neoliberal structure of the International Order has come under increased scrutiny. With every passing year, there appears to be a greater consensus that the Liberal Order sustained by American primacy is 'weakened and fractured at its core.' At present, however, despite the increasing rejection of American moral leadership, there remains no viable alternative to the established rules-based system.

The world's two most significant non-Western regimes, Russia and China, are often singled out as the main external causes, whether directly or indirectly, for the alleged 'ending' of the Liberal Order. This has led to a widespread belief in the West that Russia and China both represent an existential revisionist challenge to the Liberal International Order and aim to bring down the contemporary international system. In this view, Russia and China are perceived as sharing a common vision for the international system and often as cooperating to achieve their shared international aims. Nevertheless, this represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the two powers and their stakes in the contemporary International Order and their actual strategic aims. Russia and China may share a non-democratic system of government, believe in many of the same principles, and resent American hegemony, however, their positions within the international system are far from similar: one is a power that has lost much of its global influence and is in economic stagnation, the other has witnessed a remarkable rise in the post-Cold War era.

This essay will thus assess the two states and their place in the Liberal Order in order to determine the validity of the claims that Russia and China are revisionist powers intent on collapsing the International Order, and if their recent rapprochement means they will support each other in this objective, or whether the significant implications of the rise of China will lead to another rupture of relations between Moscow and Beijing similar to the Sino-Soviet Split of the 1960s.

The Post-Cold War International System

It is impossible to understand contemporary Sino-Russian relations regarding the Liberal International Order without understanding the significant changes in the international system that said order exists within. Therefore, prior to assessing Russia and China independently, it is necessary to briefly discuss the current state of the Western-dominated international system and its environment that has pushed Russia and China together.

The hubris of the United States and the West in the aftermath of the Cold War has been stated repeatedly. Following the end of the bipolar system after the destruction of one of its poles, the victorious United States chose to interpret the world through the prism of the defeat of the Soviet Union and its overwhelming military superiority. Embracing their nation's unprecedented global position, American leadership rejoiced over their victory and overwhelming power, with the attitude of the era highlighted by the influential neoconservative Charles Krauthammer, who celebrated the 'new unipolar world dominated by a single power, unchecked by any rival and with decisive reach in every corner of the globe.' Alexander Lukin, a Russian scholar of politics and international relations, who was awarded a medal in 2009 by former Chinese leader Hu Jintao for 'Outstanding Contribution to the Development of Sino-Russian Relations', argues that the triumphal attitude of the West led Western leaders to adopt a one-sided and often hostile, even anti-Russian, approach towards Moscow following the dissolution of the USSR, all whilst ignoring significant changes in international politics, namely the increasing trend towards economic multipolarity, and the closely related rise of non-Western powers, such as China, Brazil, and India. Lukin's critical view of Western foreign policy and 'triumphal mood' in the aftermath of the Cold War has been used here to display a well-informed Russian perspective of the post-Cold War period in order to develop a holistic understanding of the era's impact on Russia, and thus further understand Russia today.

The West's one-sided treatment of Moscow during this key period is integral to understanding the latter's resentment of the former, as well as its rapprochement with Beijing. Rather than opting to approach the new Russia as a strategic partner or make serious attempts to assimilate Russia into the Western Order, the United States opted to retain its Cold War perception of Russia long after the Cold War had ended and viewed Russia primarily as a geopolitical and strategic rival. From Russia's perspective, the 'post-Soviet consensus' was to be based on an understanding with the West that both sides

would ‘move toward closer cooperation, remain responsive to each other’s interests, and agree to make mutually acceptable compromises’, but instead the West pursued a policy of continuous encroachment on Russia’s sphere of influence, expanding NATO ever closer to Russian borders whilst trying to convince Russia that this encroachment did not pose a threat to its security. Buchanan argued that through this encroachment in the Post-Soviet Space, the United States was treating Russia ‘as the Allies had treated Germany at Versailles, rubbing its nose in its defeat and virtually designating Russia a permanent enemy.’

This approach, taken by both the administrations of presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, gave no consideration to the warnings of the pro-Western Liberals in Russia who argued that such an approach would fuel anti-Western sentiment and strengthen authoritarianism, nor to the warnings of prominent US foreign policy expert George F. Kennan, who called NATO expansion the ‘most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold War era’, and similarly stated that such a decision would ‘inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western, and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion; have an adverse effect on the development of Russian democracy and impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to US liking.’ Foreshadowing Russia’s pivot to China and its implications for the United States, Buchanan wrote in 1999 that ‘by moving NATO onto Mother Russia’s front porch, we are driving her into the arms of Beijing, and creating a hostile alliance that it is in our vital interest to prevent.’ By contrast, China’s history with the Liberal International Order in the post-Cold War era is far less confrontational. Although China faced near-universal condemnation in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre, and has again received negative international attention due to an increased focus on its human rights abuses, economic coercion, and theft of intellectual property in the Trump era, the period in between has witnessed China’s remarkable rise to the top, unhindered by the West. In under two decades following Tiananmen Square, China ‘moved from the periphery to the center of the international system’, boosted by Western encouragement of its entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001, and culminating in the powerful display of its soft power and cultural status in the 2008 Beijing Olympics.

Realist international relations scholars often warned of the implications of an increasingly assertive China, arguing, as John Mearsheimer did in his landmark The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, that China’s rise is ‘unlikely to be tranquil’ as it will try to dominate Asia in the same way the United States dominates the Western hemisphere. However, this view was largely ignored by the political elite in the West, who, believing in the universality of their own Liberal values following the Cold War, firmly backed the idea that the economic reforms in China that had enabled its rise would eventually lead to political reform and democratization. The general consensus in the West regarding the rise of China was an optimistic, Liberal approach, which argued that Beijing’s increasing economic and organizational ties with the West would ensure that a rising China assimilated to Western Liberal norms within the international system and that this would eventually lead to liberalization at home. Liberal scholars, such as John Ikenberry, claimed that the incentive

of material economic gains and the framework of organizational institutions would 'facilitate China's integration into the Liberal International Order'. Furthermore, Fukuyama argued that as an economic power is opened up to the outside world, the pull of Liberal ideas within China would continue to grow stronger. This position was perhaps best emphasized by President Bush, who in 2002 declared, "Chinese leaders are discovering that economic freedom is the only source of national wealth: In time, they will find that social and political freedom is the only source of national greatness."

China's perspective towards the Liberal International Order, and the United States, in particular, will be assessed later, but it is evident from this overview that the Western approach to Beijing was markedly different from its approach to Moscow, facilitating the rise of the former in hopes that it would assimilate to Western Liberal norms, whilst treating the latter as a strategic rival and pursuing expansion at its expense. It is clear, looking back, that both approaches failed. Russia today harbours serious resentment towards a West that it believes is 'tearing apart countries' close to its borders, such as Georgia and Ukraine, has lost faith in any partnership with the West that does not require its complete political submission and is far less likely to make any strategic concessions to facilitate cooperation with the West than it was in 1991. The watershed moment in this deterioration was the 2014 Crimean Crisis and the political confrontation with the West that followed. This act of Russian aggression shocked the West, but from Moscow's perspective, it was NATO and the United States that had not changed course after the Cold War, and with Ukraine, Russia had to react 'to show that further advancement would cost the West dearly'.

Meanwhile, despite its embrace of economic globalization, China has not embraced political liberalism and has aggressively resisted Westernization, refusing to adopt a liberal polity or liberal values, both at home and abroad. Beijing has not moved towards liberal reform, and its political crackdowns in Hong Kong, open aggression towards Taiwan and India, and assertive use of force in the disputed waters of the South China Sea have highlighted that, contrary to the Liberal hypothesis, the close economic and organizational ties that it holds with the West have not led to its full integration into the Western Order. In fact, Beijing acts in a decidedly more authoritarian manner both at home and abroad under Xi Jinping than it has in decades, while the 'China Threat' looms more significant than ever.

Russia: The Decline of The Bear

Russia holds clear and open dissatisfaction with the contemporary International Order. For almost the entirety of the Putin era (since 2000), Russia has been perceived as an aggressive challenger to the status quo. To an extent far greater than China, Russia is openly portrayed as an enemy of the United States and the established International Order, and Western media is never lacking in articles with grand headlines such as 'Mr Putin is a Threat to World Peace.' The fear that leads to these claims is not without basis,

as decision-makers in Moscow 'call for the end of the American-led political order and the Western-dominated global economy', however the Kremlin's real frustrations with the status quo are typically contorted, and Moscow is perceived as intent on chaos or world domination. Russia's most significant concern with the status quo of the international system is, of course, the unipolarity of the United States and the unilateral action that it takes on the international stage. In Moscow's eyes, American unipolarity is both a security threat due to the aforementioned expansion of US-backed organizations towards Russia's borders and an illegitimate basis for the international system. At the Munich Security Conference in February 2007, Putin declared that "the unipolar model is not only unacceptable but also impossible in today's world", going on to criticize its "unilateral and frequently illegal actions that have created new centers of tension".

Russian insistence on the unacceptability of the unipolar system is based on a fundamental belief in great power multipolarity, in which the dominant states cooperate on global affairs but remain out of each other's spheres of influence. Instead of the unipolarity of the US-dominated Liberal Order, which allows for unilateral action by the hegemon at the expense of other states, Russia would prefer to see a move towards a 'great power concert system wherein the United States shares power with other global powers. Reflecting Moscow's perception of the international balance of power, this multipolar vision of the international system would more precisely be 'based on the interactions between the United States, China, and Russia', which it considers the three most important global actors. Any international system that does not reflect this reality of international politics and does not include Russia as a major decision-maker in all essential areas of international policy is thus considered illegitimate by the Kremlin.

Moscow's preference for a multipolar order in which it plays a larger role highlights Russia's primary aim in foreign policy: to 'restore its position as a great power and a global diplomatic player'. Understanding this key driver of Russian policy is critical to understanding Russia's perception of and attitude towards the International Order. Russia is a state that considers itself a great power with a rightful 'seat at the table' of international politics, and this desire to restore its great power position is the closest thing to an ideology in Russian international policy. Every action Moscow takes at the international stage is taken with Russia's great power status in mind, and every decision, proactive or reactive, is designed to maintain Russian influence. As a state that has undeniably declined since the Cold War, a 'pale shadow of its former Soviet self', a defect most visible in its economic stagnation, Russia is 'obsessed' with reversing its declining status and maintaining its position in the international system, which it considers key to its security.

Prior to assessing Russia's perception of, and relations towards, the United States and the US-led International Order, it is appropriate to address the idea of Russia as a declining power in order to fully comprehend what Moscow believes is at stake in how it conducts its international relations. Russia indeed remains a great power and a significant one at that and is still very capable of acting as such in international affairs. Moscow's most substantial claim to its retained global power is Russia's still impressive military capabilities. Although it lags behind the United States, Russia's military still surpasses

China's, which imports Russian arms, and Russia possesses both the largest nuclear arsenal in the world, and the largest number of combat tanks. Furthermore, because Russia retains its military strength, it can use its capabilities to project its global power. Increasingly since the Ukraine Crisis in 2014, Russia has purposefully made its presence known in global hotspots in order to further its strategic preferences and protect its state interests. In Libya, for example, Russia has actively intervened in the crisis to support the militia leader Khalifa Haftar, which has included financial support, tactical missile strikes, and even deploying mercenaries from the Kremlin-backed Wagner Group. As will be discussed later, Russia's presence in Syria in particular – and its direct opposition to the interests of the United States as a supporter of the Assad regime – shows that Moscow is willing and able to use its power to achieve its state interests. Furthermore, there has been a conscious effort by the Kremlin to spread Russian influence in the Global South. After largely retreating from Africa after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has re-engaged the continent, increasing its arms-sales and security agreements and deploying both security advisors and mercenaries, such as in the Central African Republic, where a Russian serve as a national security adviser to the president, and in Mozambique, where Russian mercenaries have been utilized to help fight Islamic terrorism.

The abovementioned facts highlight the reality that Russia remains a powerful state actor and global power that can use its power to project influence, but it does not diminish the fact that whilst Moscow's relative power remains high, its absolute power (and influence) has suffered a severe decline. This decline, as previously mentioned, is most evident in Russia's economic stagnation and loss of economic capabilities. Following the dissolution of the USSR, Russia's GDP was halved, and although from 1999 to 2008, the Russian GDP grew by 7% per year (and almost doubled in just nine years), its economy rose from USD $210 billion in 1999 to 1.8 trillion in 2008. The period since the 2008 financial crisis has witnessed economic stagnation: in 2015 alone, the GDP shrank by 4%, inflation rose by 15%, and wages shrank by 9.5%. The economic impact of the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic in Russia has led the World Bank to project a 6% GDP retraction, and that Russia's economic stagnation will only be exacerbated by crude oil prices plummeting throughout 2020. Western sanctions have also impacted Russia's economic decline, isolating its economy from global financial markets and magnifying the effects whenever oil prices fall. Russia's economy simply cannot keep up with the United States and China's economic powerhouses, which significantly reduces its material capabilities. Moscow's high military spending may prop its military projection up for now. However, this spending amidst economic malaise is widely seen as unsustainable. As Russia's economy stagnates, it will be increasingly unable to allocate so much of its resources to its military.

Furthermore, whilst Russia may attempt to increase its influence in places such as Africa, this does not discount the fact that it has increasingly lost its influence in its own 'Near Abroad'. Within the Post-Soviet Space, many states traditionally under Russian influence have turned to the West: the Baltic states and various Balkan states have joined NATO and the EU, and outside of the regions it controls, Russia has lost its sway over Ukraine. Central Asia is increasingly coming under Chinese influence, as China has heavily

invested in infrastructure in the region. The completion of pipelines to China in 2009 broke Russia's monopoly on energy outlets for the region, whilst China's Silk Road Economic Belt initiative has been widely viewed as a competitor to the region's Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union. Perhaps the most evident example of Russia's loss of real influence in its traditional sphere came with the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. Although the fact Moscow helped broker the peace-deal may allude to Russia's continued hegemonic role in the Caucasus, an area in its 'Near Abroad', this hides the fact that Russia was unable and unwilling to control the conflict, and Armenia, which 'put its faith in Russia's protection against larger, richer and far better armed Azerbaijan', was defeated by Azerbaijan. This is only more significant due to Turkey's extensive role in supporting Azerbaijan. Turkey's involvement represented a clear challenge to Russian regional hegemony, and highlighted that even in areas where Moscow's influence has been entrenched for over a century, it has had to accept the influence and presence of rival powers. Therefore, whilst Russia indeed remains a strong great power, and one with strategic ambitions across the globe, it is undeniable that it does not command the same status, power, or hegemonic position it once did, and thus, in absolute terms, it has declined. Regardless of its military strength, its economic stagnation will inevitably ensure it cannot keep up with the American and Chinese powers, a fact already evident in areas like cyber power: Russia's 'troll factories' and misinformation campaigns during the 2016 US Presidential Election gained mass attention in the West, but in reality, Russia is lagging far behind in the development of high-tech capabilities and projects an 'oversized role in the cyber domain by deploying them brashly and recklessly'.

From here, assessments of Russia's confrontational relationship with the United States and the US-led International Order should begin. Russia views US hegemony as the most significant obstacle in its path to restoring its former status, and the United States as a superpower that does not take Russian interests into account and will naturally resist 'any system that puts fetters on its possibilities' in order to protect its position, thus will not readily embrace giving up its unilateral powers. Therefore, Moscow looks at the United States as a superpower that is actively trying to suppress Russia's great power ambitions, and it is through this lens that Russia interprets American foreign policy. Thus, when US-backed organizations encroach on Russian borders, Moscow perceives this as both a security threat that may lead to its 'encirclement' and a fundamental challenge to its great power status. By seeking to incorporate states such as Georgia and Ukraine, countries traditionally under Russian hegemony, the United States weakens Russia's international influence and perpetuates its decline.

Russia's perception of the realm of international politics is clearly informed by Realist theory. It is on this logic that Russia views it views its relationships with other states and how it operates on the world stage. Moscow views international politics as a zero-sum game: one state can only make gains if others lose. Therefore, a hegemonic United States exists at the expense of the other great powers, and a rising Russia represents a gain for Moscow that is explicitly at the expense of the hegemon. The Kremlin expects Washington to pursue policies of containment against a rising Russia to protect its

interests, and is thus naturally suspicious of American unilateralism and of US-led institutions, which it considers simply as an arm of American power. This is particularly important to remember when it comes to the Post-Soviet Space, which Moscow considers its exclusive political neighborhood. Any Western encroachment at all into this area, NATO, the EU or otherwise, is perceived as the West explicitly attempting to contain Russia and gain influence at its expense. As Lukin argues, Russia believes that in resisting Western encroachment near its borders, it is 'fighting for mere survival', and that its neighbors remaining friendly or at least neutral is crucial to ensuring that Russia itself is not put under the political control of the United States. Thus, Russia feels completely justified in using violence, as it did in Ukraine and Georgia, in order to protect itself. The Kremlin's major frustration with the status quo, its unipolar character, and its primary aim in foreign policy, the desire to maintain itself as a great power, have been established. Unsurprisingly, both of these areas significantly impact Russia's views of the United States: it is, after all, the unipolar power at the top, containing Russian great power ambitions. With these frustrations and aims in mind, we must finally assess Russia's relationship with the Liberal International Order directly and whether Russia represents a structurally and ideologically revisionist challenge.

The Kremlin believes that the 'fundamental logic' of the current international order is the United States' dominance, and Russian leaders assert that the US-led order is expanding to encompass the entire world. Russia contends that the United States is using its power and influence in the International Order to aggressively spread its so-called 'universal' values to all corners of the globe, and explicitly ignoring the principle of non-interference in the domestic politics of other states, which Moscow insists is a fundamental principle of international affairs. This view is articulated by Lukin, who argues that Washington is 'using pressure, and often force, to project its own vision of the world on other countries and whole regions that do not want to Westernize.' This vision, a commitment to 'universal' values such as democracy and human rights, is rejected as simply 'an ideological smokescreen for the West's attempts to impose its hegemony', which frequently leads to violence. The most cited examples of this being American interventions in Iraq and Libya, two conflicts taken under the guise of moral 'humanitarianism' which destabilized both states.

However, this should not be mistaken as Russia being a revisionist state that seeks to overthrow the system and dismantle the international order in the same way the USSR intended to. Russia is not opposed to the established norms and existing major institutions that make up the international order, nor does Moscow promote an alternative vision beyond multilateralism to the ordering of the international in the way the USSR once promoted international communism. Putin is a pragmatist, and it seems that in recent years the Kremlin has adopted two distinct paths of achieving its global aims: an independent, typically militaristic, 'hard-power' orientated approach to secure Russia's immediate strategic objectives and a stated commitment to the existing international institutions to achieve its overarching primary aim of perpetuating its great power status.

Regarding its immediate 'short-term' goals, which are often geostrategic objectives Moscow believes will enhance Russia's security, the Kremlin has opted for a fiercely independent foreign policy. This is particularly evident when Russia's position is in opposition to that of the United States. To protect what it believes is its state interests, Moscow is not only vocal in criticizing Western foreign policy but is not afraid to mobilize its aforementioned powerful military capabilities to defend its position, even if doing so places it in opposition to the leading state in the International Order. That is evident from Putin's support of the Assad regime in Syria, which has placed Moscow directly opposed to Washington. Of course, this highlights the reliance on hard power in Russian international relations, which is overtly displayed to portray that Russia is a major force that should be consulted on in major geopolitical matters. Nevertheless, this approach remains mainly reactive, and there is little threat that Moscow would ever use such an approach directly against the West, or that it will attempt to use its independent foreign policy to create its own Russian-orientated International Order. Instead, this approach is deployed to secure strategic and short-term objectives whilst showing the world Russia remains capable.

When it comes to the long-term goal of protecting Russia's great power status place, the Kremlin seems to view the established major institutions as the best way to achieve their aims and continues to see the possibility of adapting several components of the international order to reflect its interests rather than that of US domination. Russian narratives usually frame US actions in Libya and Iraq as 'violating the rules of the international order', whilst unilateralism is frequently described as illegitimate in that it allows the United States to bypass the UN. In 2015, for example, Sergey Ivanov, who was then Putin's Chief of Staff, explained in an interview how unilateral action undermined 'universally recognized institutions, like the UN Security Council'. In particular, the United Nations is appreciated by Moscow, chiefly because it fulfils the Kremlin's key foreign policy objective by recognizing Russia as a great power through permanent membership and veto power on the Security Council. The UNSC veto is a powerful asset for Moscow, as it gives Russia the ability to limit Western interference in its own sphere of influence and prevent a UN response to Russian interventions, such as in Crimea. Russia frequently asserts that the mechanism of international relations should take place within the scope of the UN. This point was highlighted by Russia's 2016 Foreign Policy Concept, which stated that the 'United Nations should maintain its central role in regulating international relations and coordinating world politics in the 21st century as it has proven to have no alternative, and also possesses international legitimacy' and reaffirmed that 'Russia supports the efforts aimed at strengthening the UN's central and coordinating role'.

Rather than attacking the International Order's established institutions, Russian narratives typically show Russia as defending them against Western overreach. In this view, Russia is protecting the international order's legitimacy by standing up for multilateralism and protecting the principle of non-interference against Western interventionism. This view was articulated by Lukin, who claimed that it was not Russia, but 'the West' that 'deliberately destroyed the post-war legal system based on the sovereignty of states and

advocated the theories of humanitarian intervention' and created a world in which powerful states destroy borders and violate treaties 'for the sake of a "good cause"'. As Russia expert Mark Galeotti argues, the Kremlin's complaint is 'not that the UN and other such instruments of the wider International Order are too powerful, but that they have been too weak in restraining the main disruptor in the world: The United States'. Moscow's explicit desire for the UN to play an integral role in global affairs and constitute the center of the International Order and its promotion of narratives that display itself as its defender highlights that Russia is not a revisionist power. The Kremlin does not wish to collapse the International Order, but instead uses it to achieve its objectives: as Galeotti puts it, the Kremlin may occasionally ignore aspects of the International Order's structure, but as a 'rump of a former superpower with grandiose expectations', it appreciates the status and leverage that said order gives Russia.

It is clear that Russia certainly represents a challenge to the status quo, and it shows particular and open hostility to American primacy. However, it is not a revisionist power with aspirations of achieving global domination and hegemony like its Soviet predecessor. Russia is a state that no longer possesses the influence it once did and is focused entirely on maintaining its position as a great power. Russia may instead be considered a reformist power that wishes to change aspects of the established International Order to benefit itself. This commitment to reform, not revisionism, is explicitly made in the 2016 Foreign Policy Concept, which promotes 'enhancing the effectiveness of the UN Security Council as part of a reasonable UN reform, while also ensuring efficiency in its operations.' Russian leaders envision a multipolar world where they not excluded and play a key role in multilateral decision making, and they have clearly chosen the structure of the existing International Order as their best way to achieve this. Russia certainly is a state opposed to Western interests and is openly scathing of US foreign policy, but the Kremlin does not seek to bring down the International Order established by the Liberal world, nor does it (or feasibly could it) promote an alternative model. Russia may hold open dissatisfaction with the status quo, but it seeks to use the International Order's established institutions to vocalize to address these grievances.

China: The Rise of The Giant Panda

China is a rising power that does not need to openly challenge the same International Order than has significantly contributed to its economic success and facilitated its remarkable rise. Although its leaders certainly have their grievances with the contemporary International Order and their visions for the future, Beijing understands that there is no urgency in confronting an existing order that has benefited from more than any other state, including the hegemon. In stark contrast to the declining Russia, which feels like it must lash out aggressively as it did with Crimea in order to preserve its great power status, China fully understands that the international system is moving in its favour. The best thing it can do is be patient and not draw negative attention to itself: why risk scorning

the West now, when their system is working in their favor and one day, they could surpass it?

Despite sharing Russian concerns over American unilateralism, China has typically been far too cautious about reacting in the same aggressive manner as this would risk retaliation from the West, such as sanctions or, in the most extreme instance, economic decoupling. Diffusing any perceptions of a 'China Threat' plays a significant role in Chinese foreign policy, which is geared towards ensuring the peaceful external conditions that will support its internal development and on preventing any efforts by outside powers to contain its rise. The very well-known narrative pushed by Beijing is that China's rise would be entirely peaceful and beneficial to all states who take part in the International Order. Beginning in the Hu Jintao era, this narrative played an official role in Chinese foreign policy, and Beijing portrayed itself as a state that, unlike previous rising powers, had no interest in using its wealth to disrupt the international system, but instead would rise on 'the back of consensus and harmony.' To articulate this position, Chinese leaders coined the term 'peaceful development' to describe its rise. Official statements by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) frequently mention their policy of 'peaceful development', such as this 2015 address by President Xi Jinping on the anniversary of the Second World War, in which he proclaimed that "in the interest of peace, China will remain committed to peaceful development. We Chinese [people] love peace. No matter how much stronger it may become, China will never seek hegemony or expansion."

Beijing's narrative has been relatively successful in the West. Despite 'China Threat' perceptions persisting throughout some levels of Western media and in the minds of some American policymakers, China has rarely occupied a position near the top in American foreign policy agendas. As shall be discussed later on, China's recent foreign policy actions have led to a re-assessment of this, and the Trump administration has wholeheartedly rejected Beijing's narrative. Far more than Russia, China represents a serious threat to American interests and the contemporary International Order. It may refrain from open confrontation with the United States out of necessity, but China's foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific region is far from harmonious and often purposefully disruptive or subversive. As Chinese global influence grows, these actions will likely no longer be confined to its regional neighborhood. Unlike Russia, lashing out to protect its declining influence, Chinese aggression will be proactive and designed to further its influence across new lands.

The doctrine of peaceful development has its roots in the 1980s, as part of the pragmatic Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping's strategic foreign policy directive to maintain a low profile, be willing to cooperate, and make time to deal with the country's internal challenges. Deng's dictum was driven by his 1978 declaration of "Reform and Opening" as Beijing's driving objective in international politics, and his pragmatism has seen China move from the economic malaise and international alienation of Mao's days to the economic powerhouse with an ever-increasing influence that it is today. However, this growth in economic power and capabilities has led to increasing calls within China for the People's Republic to be more assertive in international affairs and promote its rapidly expanding

global interests. Deng's directive may have made sense for an isolated state that was weak, as it was designed with the modest goals of furthering China's economic growth, but it was naturally defensive and set horizons too limiting for a global power with global ambitions.

The catalyst for a fundamental change in Chinese foreign relations came with the 2008 financial crisis. The crisis exposed the fatal flaws of American and Western management of the global economy, it undermined the moral legitimacy of the Liberal International Order, whose neoliberal financial policies had made the global economy suffer. This, combined with China's increased confidence due to its economic growth, allowed Beijing to take a more assertive stance in its foreign relations. This shift was clear immediately following the crisis, as then-Premier Wen Jiabao blamed the crisis on an "excessive expansion of financial institutions in blind pursuit of profit… a failure of government supervision of the financial sector" and the "unsustainable model of development, characterized by prolonged low savings and high consumption." Without actually naming the United States, it is clear that Wen was expressing Beijing's belief that the US-backed neoliberal model of the Liberal International Order held full responsibility. Chinese assertion has increased dramatically since the beginning of the Xi Jinping era, and Beijing has grown increasingly vocal. This has been driven by statesmen in China who want to use their growing capabilities to achieve long-standing Chinese foreign policy objectives, such as pushing its maritime claims in the Asia-Pacific region and more generally asserting itself as a significant player in Asia. Under Xi Jinping's leadership, China has taken an increasingly prominent and active role in international politics. For the first time, China has been able to project its power outside of Asia and has been particularly active in Africa, formally opening its first overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017. Many of the new responsibilities taken on by Beijing have reflected a positive outlook on China's increased role, such as contributing to UN peacekeeping missions, promotion of global development and infrastructure investment, and increased role in global governance.

In this era, however, Beijing has also displayed significantly increased aggression in handling its foreign policy. China and India have repeatedly clashed over their border disputes, and these have frequently turned violent. In May 2020, there was a physical confrontation in the Indian state of Sikkim, and India has accused China of sending thousands of troops into Ladakh's Galwan Valley, where in June 2020, twenty Indian soldiers were killed in a violent border clash. In the resource-rich South China Sea, Beijing has loudly asserted its claims over virtually the entire area with its 'Nine-Dash Line' and has not been afraid to militarize: in the Spratly Islands (which China, Taiwan, Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines all hold various claims over) it has installed anti-ship and surface-to-air missiles, and it has landed bombers on the Paracel Islands which it disputes with Vietnam. China has emphasized its claims over the Japanese controlled Senkaku-Diaoyutai Islands based on 'historic rights', and tensions in the Sino-Japanese relationship over the oil- and gas-rich islands have been steadily rising since a naval incident between the two sides in 2010. Its many transgressions have best displayed Beijing's increased willingness to use antagonistic methods to achieve its ambitions

against Taiwan, which the CCP regards as a breakaway province. Chinese hostility towards Taiwan has accelerated under Xi, and 2020, in particular, has witnessed a ramping up of tensions, as China's People's Liberation Army has adopted a strategy of 'gray-zone warfare' against Taiwan, intending to subdue the Taiwanese through 'exhaustion' and erode their will to resist. The tactics of this irregular warfare have included propaganda campaigns, economic pressure, and disinformation. However, the most aggressive tactic has been its repeated instances of sending military aircraft into the Taiwanese air defense identification zone and forcing Taiwan to scramble its defenses. In 2020 alone, this was done for a total of 2,972 times, costing Taiwan US$903 million.

The increased aggression on the international stage has reflected the marked increase in authoritarianism at home that has been distinctive of the Xi era. Although Beijing never embraced political liberalism as Western Liberal scholars kept claiming they would, from Deng Xiaoping's 1978 reforms onwards, political leaders in China at least allowed the notion of political reform to exist, which of course was frequently dispelled by political repressions, such as Deng's brutal response to the student uprisings in 1989, and Jiang Zemin's well-known persecution of the Falun Gong religious group. The debate over the 'viability of liberalizing', although heavily restricted, was allowed to exist, and Hu created a policy of 'intra-party democracy' in the early 2000s designed to make the CCP more transparent: the latter initiative has largely ceased under Xi, who has enforced party unity and discipline above all, and his administration has been marked by a complete lack of debate and the wholesale disappearance of any notion of reform. Furthermore, Xi's signature 'anti-corruption' campaign has been widely perceived as a purge, particularly after his two major political rivals Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang, were prosecuted.

Nowhere has Xi's authoritarianism been more evident than in Beijing's repressive undermining of Hong Kong's autonomy and the persecution of its Uyghur population. The 'Fugitive Offenders' bill that sparked the 2019-2020 Hong Kong Protests was a direct assault on the legal system that protects the political freedoms enjoyed in Hong Kong, as it would have given China the power to arrest voices of political dissent in Hong Kong and allowed extradition from Hong Kong into mainland China. This brazen infringement of Hong Kong's political liberties led to mass protests, which at its height drew participation from around two million people. Although the bill was later rescinded, the protests were rife with police brutality. Beijing pushed a 'National Security law' in May 2020 that established a national security agency in Hong Kong, which only led to more protests. In Xinjiang, the CCP has been violently suppressing the Uyghurs, a Muslim minority ethnic group. Up to one million have been placed in internment camps, and China's brutal practices towards the Uyghurs have by most accounts constituted genocide. Xi's initiative has largely driven China's actions in Xinjiang: he has referred to Beijing's actions as a 'people's war' in eradicating Islamic terrorism and has made statements such as "we must be as harsh as them and show absolutely no mercy" and given sweeping orders such as to 'round up everyone who should be rounded up.'

Mearsheimer predicted in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics that 'if China continues to grow economically, it will attempt to dominate Asia the way the United States dominates

the Western hemisphere' and Beijing's aggression in the Asia-Pacific in the last decade seems to have proven him right. As early as 2013, a summit meeting between Xi and President Obama led US foreign policy officials to believe that China's vision was to 'essentially divide the world into two spheres of influence, with China overseeing Asia in exchange for not challenging U.S. dominance elsewhere.' This seems to point to Beijing's ultimate goal as China's emergence as a new pole of influence, dividing the international system once again in two, with Asia succeeding from the US-led International Order. Sino-American tensions are certainly higher than they have been in decades, and Trump responded to Beijing's aggression with increased balancing: Washington declared China a 'strategic competitor', has increased arms sales to Taiwan, and signed a military pact with India. Nevertheless, it is too early to expect China to challenge the United States openly. The era of Deng's 'low profile' dictum is ending, but there should be no expectation of a dramatic Chinese call to 'bury' the West in the same vein as Nikita Khrushchev's USSR. Beijing still values American trade, and above all, it fears Washington may decide to decouple from China. As it stands, China has committed to criticizing America's 'Cold War mentality' and 'zero-sum mindset', and still prioritizes diffusing the 'China Threat' over challenging the United States: as recent as February 2021, it has rejected the concept of 'strategic competition' with the West. However, the negative impact of the COVID-19 pandemic has shattered China's international reputation in the West and may spell the death knell of the 'low profile' era. This may lead to another shift in how Beijing approaches its foreign policy.

Likely, Beijing will continuously test the waters to see what it can get away with on the international stage – Taiwan will likely be at the center of this, and China may test the new Biden administration's commitments in the region. For now, however, the greatest asset China has in tacitly challenging the Liberal International Order is its ability to present an alternative vision of international order through its promotion of alternative institutions that undermine the established liberal institutions. Although China has been a willing participant of the existing international institutions, and shares Russia's appreciation of the UN, its actions in these organizations do not build confidence in its actual dedication to adhering to the rules of the rules-based International Order. Most glaringly, for example, when Beijing entered the WTO, it agreed to a number of commitments, such as substantially reducing its export subsidiaries, reducing its intellectual property theft and violations, and moving towards a 'Washington Consensus' model of development. To this day, China has not committed to a single one of these promises and likely never intended to. Beijing has long been dissatisfied with the existing institutions that facilitated its rise – it has been unable to secure top spots at the Bretton Woods organizations, and its voting rights in both the World Bank and International Monetary Fund are significantly underrepresented, given the size of its economy. Even more unacceptable is that these organizations persist on operating on terms of 'conditionality' - states promise to undertake 'packages of policy reforms' to receive financial support. These conditions, of course, reflect the values of the Liberal International Order that established them and thus are viewed with intense suspicion. Considerable Chinese effort has thus instead been placed upon the creation of new, Sino-centric institutions. Beijing has used its growing regional

influence to establish its own investment bank for the Asia-Pacific region, the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB), which some has been widely perceived as evidence that China is taking modest steps to weaken the relative power of the West and disrupt the International Order. This is evidenced by the fact there was already a multilateral lender in Asia, the US-supported Asian Development Bank, which Japan dominates. Unlike the Bretton Woods organizations, the AIIB does not operate on conditionality. In providing aid, China has traditionally practiced a 'no political-strings attached' policy, not asking states to make any commitments in either market reforms or humanitarian concerns. Although the World Bank and IMF have widely criticized this for rewarding corrupt regimes, Beardsworth argues that this lack of concern for reform or basic human rights is attractive to non-democratic states after years of Neoliberal conditionality, highlighting the appeal that this alternative model of development has outside of the Western world.

The AIIB represents a Chinese vision for how the International Order should operate. The expansion of this vision through other Chinese development plans such as the Belt and Road Initiative is doing more to increase's China's global influence and status than any act of military aggression ever could. Beijing may not be as open as Moscow is in its calls to reform the American-led Order, but unlike the Russians who simply want to improve their own status and cannot formulate much of a replacement beyond desiring multilateralism, the Chinese can envision a completely new model of development. China may not be as openly hostile towards the United States to protect its economic interests and prevent a possible containment strategy by the West, but in the long run, it represents a fundamentally more significant challenge to the status quo. Its narrative may still proclaim 'peaceful development', and it certainly has not yet taken the leap towards hard, Soviet-style revisionism, but China is undoubtedly a revisionist power, and it has already achieved what the Soviet Union never did: it has built an attractive economic model with global appeal. As it continues to rise, and when its economy finally catches up to the United States, China will feel more and more confident, offering a viable alternative solution to the way things are. The world has had its unipolar moment, and the decline of American influence may suggest a multipolar trend. However, if rising Chinese influence continues to be supplemented by rising Chinese aggression, the international system may just slip back into a new bipolarity. The International Order will be ripped in half.

On the Threat of a Sino-Russian Alliance

It is not within the scope of this essay to thoroughly examine the complex Sino-Russian relationship, but it should be noted that Western fears of a military alliance between the two challenging the West are exaggerated. Moscow and Beijing share many international values and often partner strategically, but this is purely out of convenience. Despite increasing military ties and holding joint military exercises, their partnership's long-term prospects do not favor a united front. More than likely, despite increased gestures towards friendship, as China continues to rise and Russia stagnates, Moscow will become

threatened by an increasingly influential Beijing. One obvious point of contention is that China is vigorously increasing its influence in Central Asia, which some Russian experts believe will come at the expense of Russia. As we have demonstrated, Russia tends not to react well when it believes its sphere of influence is being challenged, and Chinese development plans in the region will inevitably only lead to further Chinese involvement. The Kremlin does not want to replace one hegemon for another. The growing disparity in influence and Russia's growing trade dependency on China suggests will not be equal. Furthermore, despite its hostilities with the United States, Russia will not want to be dragged down with China as the latter continuously butts heads with the West, similar to how China has typically distanced itself from Russian aggression. In the coming years, the most likely outcome will be acts of strategic balancing by Moscow to position themselves between Washington and Beijing.

Conclusion

Russia and China are both clearly opposed to Western geopolitical objectives, and with their aggressive foreign policies remain strategic threats. However, their aggressive policy aims differ wildly and do not share the same vision for the International Order. Russia feels backed into a corner and desires an order built around multipolarity and multilateralism in order to protect its great power status and waning influence. Its attitude is hostile but reformist in nature. China may make gestures in the same direction but ultimately views the United States as its only global counterpart, and thus bipolarity on the horizon. Beijing's aggressions are not ill-conceived attempts to protect its existing status but the actions of an increasingly confident global power trying to use its rising status to achieve its aims. Russia may call for an end of the American dominance of the established order, but not much else: it is solely focused on a zero-sum game, where American influence must be diminished for Russian influence to rise. Chinese ambitions go far beyond this. Beijing is a revisionist power building a new International Order with its own rules. It may not yet present itself as such, but this alternative system looms ever larger as a revisionist threat that may one day tear the international system in two once again.

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Women in Post-conflict UN Peacekeeping: adjusting the narrative contributions, limitations, and expectations of inclusive peacekeeping

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Introduction

This study aims to provide a critical analysis of the presence and role of women in UN peacekeeping operations within post-conflict settings. By enquiring whether they stand to make unique contributions to these missions, and how these contributions can be viewed from a nuanced gender perspective, we will argue that there is both a need and a benefit to the inclusion of more women in peacekeeping missions. For this purpose, this essay will introduce the main discussions of the further integration of women within United Nations peacekeeping operations as a contextual basis. We will then evaluate the subjacent problems intrinsic to much of the narrative surrounding female peacekeepers, advocating for a less essentialized interpretation of women's experiences in peacekeeping. In order to critique these narratives, we will introduce an examination of the gender dynamics within peacekeeping forces and refer to the experiences of peacekeepers in the field. This essay will then explore the commonly cited instrumentalist arguments used to argue that increasing women peacekeepers leads to operational benefits, as well as the possible constraints that may inhibit this impact. These will be explored specifically in regards to benefits key to post-conflict missions that serve to build more effective and long-lasting peace. We will engage the problems inherent in some of the expectations placed on women peacekeepers, while also highlighting the benefits their presence can hold when aided by adequate training, gender aware leadership and institutional support. Having established this, conclusions will be drawn regarding the

repercussions of the integration of women in peacekeeping, as well as what this signifies on for the broader Women, Peace and Security agenda.

Women in peacekeeping operations: discussions and prevailing narratives

The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 and the development of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda brought forth much discussion on the need for more women in peace efforts; both as a means fundamental to peace building, and to support and respond to the specific challenges faced by women and girls during and after conflict. The concrete policy manifestations of the WPS agenda have centered on the increase of women peacekeepers and the establishment of gender sensitive training. These efforts have attempted to create visibility for women's roles thought both on the ground interaction and representation in senior decision-making roles. Thus, UN peacekeeping forces have attempted to establish a progression of gender balancing in their missions, and called for gender mainstreaming to be integrated into all peacekeeping operations (PKOs). As a result, much academic focus has been placed on the steps required to effectively increase women's participation in peacekeeping, as well as the arguments evaluating the benefits of said inclusion.

The role of women in the implementation of PKOs, not only as a matter of principle, but as a necessary precondition for their optimal implementation and benefit to the overall objective of long-term peace building, has only become widely accepted during the past two decades. Generally, the importance of this role is understood along two major lines of argumentation: the instrumentalist rationale, centered on possible operational benefits, and the gendered analysis, based on the lessons learned from success cases in equal opportunity peacekeeping efforts and subjacent narratives regarding women's role in PKO's.The instrumentalist rationale states that women's contributions within these operations hold a multifaceted impact; correlated with increases in the level of security and cooperation with local women, increased trust from the host community, and better civilian-military interaction . These factors correlate positively with PKO's stability in post conflict societies. Despite this, percentages of women participating in these operations remain strikingly low, especially in police and military troops, characterized as highly male-dominated spaces. In tandem, despite the increases of gender awareness training for peacekeeping staff, both pre-deployment and in- mission, few peacekeepers ultimately receive any training on the specific issues conditioning gender relations in their deployment station, and implementation varies extremely by troop-contributing country and mission.

Additionally, feminist scholars have brought attention to the problematic underlying assumptions that define many of the contributions presented previously; defending a more nuanced analysis of gender dynamics in peacekeeping, and a more realistic interpretation

of the ability and constraints women peacekeepers face in the field. These scholars have argued that the extreme benefits presented as a result of a greater representation of women in PKO's may even be detrimental to the ultimate goal being pursued of a more inclusive and gender aware model of peacekeeping. Indeed, studies conducted on the quantifiable operational benefits of inclusion demonstrate that they necessitate a "complimentary focus gender equality at a structural level" to truly yield results and improve the efficiency of PKO's. This is coherent with the fact that, even when efforts for inclusion are undertaken by increasing women in PKO's, this does not automatically bring forth gender equality in the forces or establish gender mainstreaming as a practice in PKO's. While this may seem obvious, the "add women and stir" dynamic remains pervasive in state policy as a final goal, rather than a step towards effective gender equality.

To actually develop meaningful participation of women in PKO's, women need to be integrated into senior positions with capacity to affect decision-making and leadership within the operations, and women peacekeepers must receive training that will allow them to substantially affect and transform the context and development of their missions. Furthermore, as stated by Sabrina Karim and Kyle Beardsley, "the challenges peacekeeping operations face are institutional in nature", and thus require structural changes to be implemented in conjunction with women's representation and leadership in order to affect the fundamental power structures of peacekeeping. An in-depth look at these structural issues must take into account constructions of gender within both UN narrative and documents; particularly in regards to gender mainstreaming and its implications. The present dominant UN discourse regarding gender and peace missions is based on the assumption of "equal but different", and may inhibit the effective inclusion of women in this sphere by implicitly relying on essentialized conceptions of women. This generates a certain "paradox of women's difference", and can create problems for female soldiers within their militaries, acting as a rupture point between the rhetoric associated with women in PKO's and the realities they face when deployed in post-conflict settings.

Ultimately, we can affirm that while the Women, Peace and Security Agenda has effectively driven the efforts to develop gender balancing as a key pillar for PKO's success, the narratives prevalent in UN discourses of inclusion and gender mainstreaming may remain problematic in the way they essentialize womanhood. Thus, further introspection into both the instrumentalist rationale and the gendered analysis of peacekeeping operations is necessary to evaluate the impact women's inclusion holds in post-conflict PKO's.

Gender in Peacekeeping missions: moving beyond the "add- women-and-stir" logic and holistic narratives of inclusion

Gendered values and norms remain underlying factors in the characterization and development of PKO's; thus, they hold a key towards changing pervasive gender regimes within military forces involved in these operations. However, it must be questioned whether current missions and peacekeeping efforts can truly be regarded as a push for a new gender regime in international security or they echo and reproduce the traditional combat mindset and gender roles that have come to define the military order. Driven largely by the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, the UN has sought to not only increase the number of women in PKO's, but implement a strategy of gender mainstreaming, defined as "the process of assessing the implications for both men and women of any planned action, program, policy, or legislation". Nevertheless, numerous critiques to the UN's approach to gender mainstreaming have arisen based on the way it implies gender as a "difference between men and women and not as a system of femininities and masculinities and power hierarchies between them". While the objective to increase women's participation at all levels in peace efforts it is valuable in itself, the UN's gender mainstreaming strategy seems to assume that this increase will automatically yield results, and focuses too much on those participating in PKO's, rather that the local population of the deployed missions. The 'add- women-and-stir' approach is widely criticized for its underlying assumption that simply the presence and participation of women will serve to transform the established gender hierarchies in peacekeeping. This approach to gender reform also serves to essentialize and totalize women's experiences; overlooking the differences of women's identity and political goals resulting from economic, social, or ethnic factors. In truth, merely including more women into a system with such a gendered power structure as the military yields results that are often mostly cosmetic. While evidence suggests that in certain contexts women can indeed have a positive impact on PKO's effectiveness when integrated into its units, the broadly promoted "unique" contributions expected of women peacekeepers represent a "false holism of women in the military". Paradoxically, women's participation is often held in high regard due to stereotypical assumptions of feminine qualities. In this manner, the promotion of gender mixed units veers uncertainly between rhetoric of gender equality and gender difference. The issue that necessarily arises in this rationale is the value attributed to femininity in peacekeeping, and the implications that are subjacent to the consideration of women in these missions.

According to Claire Duncanson, the gendered issues pervasive in PKO's "stem from a particular form of military masculinity, hegemonic within western militaries, associated with practices of strength, toughness and aggressive heterosexuality". Similarly, Olivera Simić states that patriarchy and sexism, in combination with the engrained military masculinities prevalent in peacekeeping, ultimately serve to undermine the optimal use of women in PKO's, and compromise their ability to function as equals within the force. Although there

is evidence of the development of alternative narratives of military masculinities in peacekeeping; it remains questionable to the extent that said narrative defies the hegemony of the overall model. Thus, peacekeeper masculinity remains problematic, despite disrupting some linkages between militarism and masculinity, because it remains reliant on the construction of a feminized and racialized "other". The presence of these overarching concepts in peacekeeping defines a context where women face the pressure to assimilate into dominant military values, may be unable to execute their potential effectively, and suffer from discriminatory treatment. Ultimately, it remains clear that gendered norms define the structure and operative nature of peacekeeping missions. Despite this, much of the focus of the UN's push for women in PKO's, even their approach to gender mainstreaming, falls into an 'add- women-and-stir' dynamic; assuming that solely the presence and participation of women will yield results, and can transform the conventional gender hierarchies in peacekeeping. While women stand to make contributions to PKO's effectiveness, this vision sets impossible expectations for women in the field to add unique contributions without sufficient systemic support, while being constrained by engrained conceptions of military masculinities, patriarchy and sexism.[1]Thus, there is a need to evaluate the possible contribution women can make to PKO's from a more nuanced perspective; taking into account these systemic constraints to reflect the problems with overly simplified expectations for women's inclusion.

Practical benefits of the inclusion of women in post-conflict peacekeeping and constraints to optimization

In the words of Donna Bridges and Debbie Horsfall, "peacekeeping is a task of great consequence" and therefore is best aided by forces representative of different genders. As mentioned previously, gender has steadfast become a more relevant factor in the development, implementation and control of PKO's. In 2020, the United Nations reported that from a force of over 95.000 peacekeepers, women accounted for 15,7% of their personnel, between military contingents and UN Peacekeeping Police. Many have argued that increased percentages of women personnel and military units within ongoing UN PKOs are beneficial to overall operational effectiveness. The topic of these contributions has greatly shaped the push the UN has set forth for the inclusion of more women in PKO's, as well as been discussed extensively in academic writing. However, many of the main contributions provided should be critically understood in a manner that both recognizes the potential a more inclusive force holds, and the way in which certain elements of the discussion rely on holistic and essentialized interpretations of women in PKO's. From an instrumentalist rationale, it becomes important to analyze whether female peacekeepers stand to make a unique contribution to post-conflict missions, in practice, based on their gender, and what these contributions may be. Furthermore, we must also examine which military and operational constraints may affect the ability of women peacekeepers to develop their differential potential within said missions.

Many of these critical assessments are context based, as it remains important to understand women's contributions to post-conflict peacekeeping in relation to the experiences of those already present on the field. Particularly important to mention is the role of women peacekeepers in the South African National Defense Force (SANDF), and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) with its all-female formed police unit (FFPU), considered a success case in peacekeeping. These missions were followed by Rwanda women in the mix-gender contingent of UNAMID force in Darfur and the Indian Female Engagement Team in the MONUSCO Mission for the Democratic Republic of Congo. The input of these operatives is fundamental to correctly evaluate the role of women in peacekeeping, as they have become paradigmatic cases and exemplify the challenges women face in realizing the contributions they can make to conflict and post-conflict situations. The main possible areas of impact explored will be: interaction with local communities, specifically women and girls; influence on entrenched patriarchal attitudes; encouragement for women from the host community to mobilize; gathering of community-based intelligence; and the prevention, reporting, and mitigation of sexual abuse. Each of these possible contributions will be critically understood in a manner intended to subvert essentialized conceptions of the role of women peacekeepers in post-conflict societies, and offer a more nuanced understanding of the benefits deriving from said inclusion in PKO's.

Interaction with local communities is often presented as one of the most vital areas where a gendered approach could be most beneficial. There is an urgent need in post-conflict situations for peacekeepers to work closely, and in a respectful and inquisitive manner, with their host society. Some studies suggest that women can identify more closely with the issues facing civilians, specifically, women and children. However, this remains contested, and heavily dependent on the level of interaction they may have with the host society. Interaction between both parties depends on factors such as identification with the challenge's local populations face, trust afforded to the peacekeeping force, the cultural acceptance of the host society of women within this force, a lack of language barriers, and commonalities in racial, ethnic, religious or cultural identities, among others. In fact, was a problem in the case of female peacekeepers from South Africa, Burundi and Rwanda, who were primarily Christian and dark-skinned, when engaging in the UNAMID mission for the Darfur conflict, as local Arab women mistrusted them due to differences in religion, language and skin color. Thus, we can affirm interaction is highly context specific, and will depend on issues beyond gender to exist. However, it does also hold a notable gendered dimension, as societal or cultural factors may cause local women and girls to be more inclined to engage with female peacekeepers, as explained by peacekeepers in the ONUCI mission in Côte d'Ivoire. This defines the importance of deploying gender mixed units; both because it facilitates interaction, and because gender can be a significant element in certain circumstances.

In a similar manner, the ability women peacekeepers too may hold to influence entrenched patriarchal attitudes is also dependent on both the interaction with the host society and their visibility as role models, breaking the image of men as unique providers of security.

Such an effect is magnified if deployed women are visual in their representation of the roles they undertake and a notable numerical component of the force. If these aspects are positive, female peacekeepers can drive change and encourage women from the host community to mobilize; as evidenced by the Indian all-female unit deployed in the UN's mission to Liberia, which led Liberian National Police to receive "three times the usual number of female applicants in the month following their deployment". It is also important to consider that in order to truly aid local women in mobilizing, and provide appropriate support for them in both promoting equality and challenging patriarchal values, women peacekeepers must have a "solid grasp of gender dynamics of host nations and how their actions can either protect or undermine local women's insecurity and vulnerability". This necessitates adequate training to enable them to aid local women's initiatives and help promote their agency in situations of insecurity, as in the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) the insecure environment limited the capacity of female peacekeepers to engage directly with local women.

Community-based intelligence gathering can also strongly benefit from a gendered approach, when properly combined with the necessary cultural awareness. In principle, female peacekeepers may be able to interact with local women more informally, and thus may be able to enhance the intelligence of a mission. However, this expectation is unmatched by any specific intelligence training provided to peacekeepers; leading to a loss of potential insight in instances where gender would be a condition to access such information. Maybe the most discussed and even contentious issue in regards to the expansion of the number of women within peacekeeping forces is whether they can help prevent, report, and mitigate sexual abuse in PKO's. One of the problematic aspects related to this narrative is the belief that women will automatically operate as a sexual violence problem-solving unit; by "undertaking a complex role as protectors of local women from local men and male peacekeepers". There is little empirical evidence to support these claims. Additionally, this notion reinforces the perception of women as caretakers and natural peacemakers, that will reign in their male counterparts. Such a narrative also implies assumptions that increased representation of women in peacekeeping will lead to decreases in the cases of HIV/AIDS, a lesser presence of brothels around peacekeeping bases, and a reduction of children fathered and abandoned by peacekeepers. Dyan Mazurana et al. counter this narrative by arguing that "the presence of female peacekeepers does not appear to deter some male peacekeepers from physically abusing local populations", and question the extent to which their presence may act as a deterrent for sexual violence.

Another matter to take into account as whether women hold a higher capacity to address sexual violence in this context as currently enabled by their training. UN Resolution 1888 states that "women and children affected by armed conflict may feel more secure working with and reporting abuse to women in peacekeeping missions". This may be so in principle, and can open up new possibilities to explore and enhance the capacity of PKO's to address women's security issues. However, this potential impact is once again highly context specific, and dependent on the ability the force has to interact with local

population, as well as the level of trust said population has in them. Furthermore, some studies seem to indicate that locals are more likely to identify the uniform of peacekeepers, rather than their gender, as their main identity and alignment; thus, complicating the reporting process beyond a gender dimension. To this we must add the claims made by female peacekeepers that they are indeed not trained to effectively deal with cases of sexual violence and therefore often do not know how to assist or even where to refer the victims of said abuse. Ultimately, while certain evidence suggests the presence of women peacekeepers can lead to some changes in unit behavior, it isn't realistic to expect that this will generate significant alterations in the general problem of sexual misconduct, and does not in any way address its root causes. Countering abuse has been diverted as a responsibility to women peacekeepers in a manner that is, firstly, unrealistic in its expectations; secondly, diverting responsibility for prevention and accountability for sexual violence from the troop contributing countries and chain of command to women in the force; and thirdly, does not represent a true assessment or improvement of gender balance and equality within PKO's. While women hold a potential impact in addressing sexual violence, their presence alone will change little; with positive results in emerging only from more institutionalized and widespread efforts for gender equality, professionalization training, and the establishment of specific and mandatory gender mainstreaming in PKO's.

In sum, when considering the potential impact of including more women in post-conflict peacekeeping, it remains important to note both the unique contributions they may provide, and the structural and operational constraints that may hinder this differential potential. Furthermore, any contributions must be understood critically, and refer to experiences of women currently in field operations, so as to not fall back on essentialized conceptions and unrealistic expectations of women's role in PKO's. We can affirm women stand to make differential contributions to the overall operational effectiveness of these missions in areas such as interaction with local communities, aiding in the mobilization of women in the host society, community-based intelligence gathering, influencing patriarchal attitudes, and, to a small extent, could possibly affect sexual abuse reporting if properly enabled to do so. However, these contributions are only possible if accompanied by training specific to the mission's host country gender dynamics and needs; as well as progressive structural changes that allow for the breakdown of institutional hindrances to equal opportunity peacekeeping.

Conclusions and reflections

This paper has sought evaluate some of the relevant aspects pertaining the inclusion of women in post-conflict peacekeeping. Through the analysis of the predominant narratives in the field, a gendered analysis of peacekeeping, and an evaluation of the contribution's women can offer to PKO's, this study concludes that there is in fact a need to include more women in post-conflict peacekeeping. The benefits of having more gender-mixed units in peacekeeping cannot be generalized, and the possible impact of women in these missions

remains context specific. However, there is sufficient evidence to affirm that when properly trained, visible, and engaged with the host community, women peacekeepers can provide unique contributions to PKO's based on their gender and enhance operational success. These contributions are optimized when tailored to the community's needs, aided by gender-aware leadership, and developed as part of a greater gender mainstreaming effort.

Simply recruiting more women remains insufficient to expect changes, and it is fundamental to avoid the "add women and stir" narrative in devising new policies for PKO's. Both the UN and governments should view the further inclusion of women in peacekeeping as a means towards a greater goal; the promotion of gender equality and the integration of nuanced gender mainstreaming policies as natural elements of PKO's. The objective of these policies should always be to better the security of the societies where the mission is deployed and ensure equal opportunity peacekeeping. Gender mainstreaming should contribute, along with structural transformations, to achieving more equal representation, alterations in traditional definitions of peacekeeper identity, and subverting the male-dominated structure of peacekeeping; as conditions necessary for the effective inclusion of women in peace operations.

The promotion of these policies will not only have a distinctive effect on PKO's, but also contribute to the development of new narratives and approaches to gender equality within the broader Women, Peace and Security agenda. A new stepping stone towards achieving long term peace and ensuring a commitment to gender equality, no longer as an inspiration, but as a practice.

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Population transfers and division of territory - plausible approaches to peace?

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After any war or violent conflict, the key question posed to participants and the international community in general is how a lasting peace can be restored. In cases in which both a peaceful resolution and a decisive victory of one side over the other cannot be expected, population transfers and divisions of territory are sometimes recommended. However, they are a highly debated way of conflict resolution, and are mostly employed to resolve ethnically motived civil wars.

Supporters of it, such as Chaim Kaufmann, see it as a necessary tactic to end violence when all other methods of conflict resolutions fail, others such as James Fearon however find it to be too problematic to use frequently and eagerly. This article will examine these debates and determine whether or not partition and population transfers are a plausible approach to peace, while at this point supporting the hypothesis that they are not, and arguing in agreement with Fearon and similar authors. It will test the hypothesis through a range of arguments, starting with those in favor of partition and population transfers as a plausible approach to peace, such as heightened levels of democracy in a state after partition, followed by the aspect of prevention of fighting through geographical separation of warring parties, before finally showing it as a last resort in wars that could not be resolved in otherwise. Then, it will move on to explore partition and population transfers as not being plausible approaches to peace, beginning with the aspect of it not addressing the root causes of the civil war. Following this, the possibility of causing problems and violence worse than the civil war through partition and population transfers will be shown, before highlighting that historically, partitions have not been successful. Moving on to moral aspects opposing partition and population transfers, uprooting in the context of suffering on an individual level will be explored, followed by showing it as a type of ethnic cleansing, and highlighting the colonial undertones is possesses. Finally, the third-party-problem will be explored, before a case study of whether or not Syria shall be partitioned will be conducted to show partition and population transfers in a current context.

Before exploring these arguments however, some definitions this article uses must be clarified. Divisions of territory, which are referred to as 'partitions' as is the standard in the literature, are defined as "a civil war outcome that results in territorial separation of a sovereign state", bearing in mind that there are de facto partitions, which mean "achieving physical separation of the groups within the same state" and de jure partitions, which include "dividing opposing […] groups into sovereign states". Population Transfers are defined as the "physical separation of the rival groups", mainly through forced movements of whole groups of the population from one territory to another. While Kaufmann sees partition and population transfers as inherently linked, this article will stray from this notion and see them as separate in effect, difficulty, and moral debates. Further, in order to examine them as an approach to peace, peace shall be "negative peace which is the absence of violence, absence of war - and positive peace which is the integration of human society", thereby defining a plausible approach to peace as something which can plausibly and within reasonable limits to human suffering achieve one of the types of peace.

Higher chances of democracy and ending the security dilemma – the case for divisions of territory and population transfers

First, the validity of arguments showing partition and population transfers as a plausible approach to peace shall be examined, beginning with a higher chance of achieving democracy in a state after partition. John Mearsheimer and Stephen van Evera highlight this in the case of Slovenia's succession from Yugoslavia, arguing that the key to ensuing peace and democracy was ethnic homogeneity in Slovenia. Andreas Wimmer puts this down to nationalism, arguing that nationalism being more prevalent in ethnically homogenous states makes governance easier due to increasing citizens' support of the state. In this way, they are more likely to support a weak, democratic government that was installed after partition, giving said government a better chance to thrive and democratically rebuild. This is connected to the aspect of political representation, as in a homogenous state after partition and population transfers the government is likely to share the same ethnicity/culture/religion as the citizens, making them feel more represented and simplifying governance.

Supporting this argument, Thomas Chapman and Philip Roeder have compiled and analyzed data which shows that states with low levels of democracy that were partitioned had higher levels of democracy following the partition, and also democratized quicker than those that were not partitioned. This shows that partition and population transfers are a plausible approach to peace, as they create democracies which are both statistically and according to Democratic Peace Theory less likely to fight each other. Therefore, when partitioned states become democracies, their conflict is likely to be resolved through this, even though it is worth noting that this seems to mainly apply to de jure partitions.

Moving on, there is the aspect of geographical separation of warring groups through partition and population transfers. Barry Posen explains this as a solution to war through saying that war is caused by a security dilemma, in which groups have no choice but to defend themselves through threatening others. He argues that because in ethnically mixed groups the opportunity for attack is much higher, groups try to establish non-mixed defensive enclaves for themselves, causing a civil war, an argument that has been used extensively by Kaufmann too. Due to its basis on shared territory, the security dilemma is ended through partition and population transfers, and according through Kaufmann only through this, as other recognized approaches to peace such as institution building would still leave groups without a stronghold of territory.

Partitions and population transfers are also justified in this line of thought as they are seen not as case of splitting up a country, but merely formalizing a split that has occurred already through the establishment of the aforementioned defensive enclaves along with refugee movements. A popular example for the success of this is the case of Bosnia, in which while causing immense suffering until this day, the Dayton Accords have created a negative peace through geographical separation of groups engaged in the civil war. Therefore, especially considering that separation often begins to naturally occur in a civil war setting, finalizing a separation through partition and population transfers is a plausible approach to peace, as simply through geographical distance warring groups are discouraged from both engaging in the war but also from committing war crimes such as ethnic cleansing, as they have significantly opportunity and reason to do so. This particularly holds true from a realist perspective, putting the main focus on states, rather than the impact on the individual.

As a final positive point, partition and population transfers must be considered as a last resort when every other approach at peace has failed. This is heavily linked to the earlier point of geographical separation, which is the actual last resort action taken, however this point shall explore the reasons why sometimes all other options fail, leaving only partition. One reason for this is, that in a large-scale ethnic conflict, the atrocities committed often mean that there is no reconciliation possible, especially with regards to war crimes. Further, as ethnic wars often take place in weak states, negotiations to end conflict are difficult to successfully execute, as they involve adhering to terms such as disarmament, which neither party feels secure enough to adhere to, as Barbara Walter argues. She supports this by showing that between 1940 and 1990 only 20% of civil wars were ended through negotiations, as opposed to 55% of intrastate wars.

Further, returning to the example of Bosnia, partition (including de facto) and population transfers can be seen as the last feasible option that does not include a large-scale and long-term third-party policing commitment. Mearsheimer and Robert Pape point this out when making the case against the Vance-Owen plan and in favor of partition in Bosnia. In this case, the aspects of uprooting (to be addressed later) and population transfers to complete a partition are presented as a necessary evil, and partition as not ideal but better than others, raising the point that while it might not be an entirely plausible approach to peace, it might be more plausible than others.

These points show that even while partition and population transfers might not be an entirely plausible approach to peace due to their various shortcomings, they are often the most plausible option and a last resort, when all other ways to end a war have failed or are impossible to even attempt. This is very important to consider especially when criticizing partition, as often in criticisms of it there are no other options presented that would be a more plausible last resort approach to peace.

Failure to succeed and widespread violence and human suffering – the case against divisions of territory and population transfers

Having presented mainly realist arguments in which partitions and population transfers are a plausible approach to peace, the article will now turn to ways in which they are not, putting a strong emphasis on the word 'plausible', as it seems difficult to entirely deny that they can be an approach to peace, having considered the previous arguments. First, more practical points of partitions simply not working will be considered, beginning with the problem of partitions not addressing the root causes of the war they are meant to end.

> *"Most countries contain a diverse array of peoples living within their borders, but only a relative few descend into violence. What causes civil war is not ethnic diversity, but rather weak and exclusive states."*

This is what Adam Alexander says, and a key point in which this article supports the argument that partitions and divisions of territory are not plausible approaches to peace. If ethnically mixed populations are not the problem, then separating them cannot be the answer, and the security dilemma highlighted by Posen and Kaufmann seems irrelevant as a concept. Instead, solutions to ethnic conflict should address these root causes and e.g., aid a country in establishing a strong and widely supported government, as well as addressing humanitarian issues such as extreme poverty. As these root causes are not addressed by partition and population transfers, and can even be exacerbated by them (as will be shown in following points), they are not a plausible approach to peace. While the fact that peace can be created in the short term through the aforementioned geographical division of warring parties cannot be denied, unless the root causes are addressed, this article does not consider it a plausible approach. A plausible approach would ensure that peace is long-lasting and violence is ended or at least decreases immediately, however this is not the case in partitions or population transfers as shall be explained.

Going into more detail on the aforementioned possibility of war breaking out soon again after partitions and population transfers and violence increasing, there are many examples which show this. The de facto partition of Cyprus has highlighted that once divided from one another, actors suddenly focus on differences within their group, causing violence in

an area that was peaceful before the partition, such as in this case intra-Greek violence. Further, partition can inspire violence in separate parts of the world, as separatist movements are almost encouraged to engage in a violent conflict or civil war, thinking that they will be partitioned and therefore reach their separatist goals.

Moreover, especially in population transfers, there is a risk of large-scale violence as was the case in India and Pakistan during their political partition, where a million lives are estimated to have been lost in massacres that occurred as followers of one religion crossed territories now belonging to the other. In these cases, partitions and population transfers have not even achieved a negative peace, thereby proving to not be a plausible approach to peace, as even if there was peace after the initial violence of a population transfer, this violence means it was not plausible anymore. However not only the risk of war and violence between the warring groups is heightened after a partition and population transfer, the risk of violence against 'left over' minorities are also increased in the point of view of this article. As a partition can never perfectly encompass everyone from a certain ethnic group and therefore does not create fully homogenous states, there is increased violence against those that are left in the states not corresponding to their ethnicity, as well as those minorities that belong to neither of the partitioned groups. In this case the risk of ethnic cleansing is higher, as the group that is now the majority in a state tries to fully homogenize it. Women in this situation are also more likely to be subject to rape or other sexual violence, as the dominant group uses it as a tool to show the woman as 'impure' and expel her from her community, thereby eliminating this minorities' ability to procreate.

Furthermore, another aspect showing the infeasibility of especially population transfers, is the issue of both oversaturation and lack of certain professions in communities after partition. This can lead to (violent) uprisings, and could for example be seen in the partition of India and Pakistan, in which "educational institutions were depleted of […] teachers overnight", once more showing partitions and population transfers as implausible approaches to peace. Seeing the violence that can erupt in states now defined by a singular ethnicity, religion or culture, especially against minorities or women, means that at least according to the definition of this article the peace is not plausible as it is not achieved within reasonable limits of human suffering. Moving on again to a more practical and statistical point, partitions in the past have also more likely than not been unsuccessful in achieving their main aim – peace. For example, in Cyprus the situation has not significantly improved since the de facto partition, and India and Pakistan have openly engaged in interstate war multiple times since being partitioned. Taking into account again the dimension of human suffering, this makes partition simply not seem 'worth it'. Radha Kumar puts these failures of partitions down to it being impossible to solve the aforementioned root causes later on, as reconciliation becomes less likely after a formalized split drives community further apart.

Considering once more the example of Cyprus, it seems locked in almost a standstill with a large risk of Greco-Turkish war, as there is no power strong enough to win over the island without international war, but international organizations such as the UN are too

weak to force a settlement, showing that in this case the de facto partition has actually prevented any type of long-lasting and plausible peace. Nonetheless, the question arises how this can be the case when in an earlier point Chapman and Roeder's work on the democratic success of partitions was shown. Simply, this can be explained through Nicholas Sambanis' and Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl's work: there were data-coding errors in the statistics showing partition as uniquely successful, and when using the correct data, it does not perform better than other approaches to peace. Therefore, while still showing partitions and population transfers as an approach to peace, it proves that they are not a plausible approach or should in any way be favored over other approaches due to the problems on both international level and the level of the individual they cause.

"To be rooted is perhaps the most important and least recognized need of the human soul".

This writes French philosopher Simone Weil, and in the context of the often-mentioned human cost of partitions and population transfers, it rings true. Many authors, especially realist ones, seem to disregard the aspect of individual fate in partition, caring only about the larger implications for the international system, when from the point of view of this article the human aspect is what differentiates a plausible approach to peace from an implausible one. When considering what makes up the identity of a person, their ethnicity or religion are not the only factors. There are many local and regional identities that people have, containing elements such as the family home and personal history, making them very attached to the physical space they exist in and causing "widespread grief and mourning" in the case of displacement.

Many Indian and Pakistani writers have reported this from the Indian partition saying and that "the history books do not record the pain, trauma and sufferings of those who had to part from their kin, friends and neighbors, their deepening nostalgia for places they had lived in for generations, […]", showing the harrowing reality of population transfers on a personal level. Often, the trauma of losing one's identity is so significant that transferred populations do not remain in the places they were resettled in, but instead return to their original homes, as was the case with many *'Ungarndeutsche'*. They say that *"Wir haben beschlossen (zurückzukehren), weil wir absolut nicht dort hingehört haben."* ("We decided to return, because we just did not belong there at all") once again showing population transfers as ineffective. This shows that not only the intense suffering people have to endure in partitions and population transfers mean they are not plausible approaches to peace, but also that the general rationale behind them is flawed, as the identity of the individual is shown the be connected to the local area, rather than being purely connected to e.g., ethnicity. In an even more contentious way of seeing it, especially population transfers have been likened to ethnic cleansing. While this at first glance seems exaggerated, this article has come to agree with authors such as Fearon, who call it "internationally sponsored and legitimized ethnic cleansing". As the rationale behind ethnic cleansing often is homogenizing a state's population and removing everyone not belonging to the majority ethnicity or religion, populations transfers are inherently similar

to this. No matter whether or not they may produce peace, they cannot be considered a plausible approach to peace, as by favoring techniques of ethnic cleansing they are discouraging the principle of multi-ethnic states and diversity, which is what much of modern society is founded on. Once more, this shows that partition and especially population transfers are not plausible approaches to peace, as any type of ethnic cleansing is simply unacceptable. Especially when used in a peace process it is unsuitable, simply due to the sheer brutality of it, no matter if physically violent or not.

Moving on to another moral reason why partitions and population transfers are not plausible as an approach to peace, and focusing more on partition and the state-level again, the colonial undertones in it must be acknowledged. David Rieff speaks of a process of "recolonization" in which a stronger third power executes a partition without needing the approval of the state concerned, just like colonial powers dividing their colonies. This article finds it to therefore inherently violate sovereignty and rights of the state being partitioned, showing it as extremely inappropriate nowadays.

In 1947, the IPU declared that "The era of mass systematic transfers is at an end", showing how out of date the concept is nowadays, many years on from then. When taking a closer look at who really benefits from partitions, the colonial aspects become even more evident, as it is often done for the sake of a greater power that conducted and intervention but does not want to continue policing the state – a "strategy of divide and quit" according to Kumar. It seems as if "norms [did] not matter when they conflict with major power interests", in this case said with reference to Bosnia. This intense violation of sovereignty and ignorance of norms in partitions and population transfers, but also the moral implications of effectively returning to the great power politics of colonial times show that while a potential approach to peace, they are not plausible in the current international system. Not only are they inappropriate in a decolonized world, they are also less likely to produce a lasting peace, because the people affected by it played no part in the peace processes. This links well to the more practical implications of what this article refers to as the third-party-problem: the set of issues created when a third power partitions a territory for peace. As this outside power is often unfamiliar with the customs and demographics of the territory partitioned and the populations transferred, mistakes are bound to be made. Referring back to the case of India and Pakistan, the partition line in this case was drawn by British lawyer Cyril Radcliffe, who had to "rely on deadlocked advisors, out-of-date maps, and inaccurate census figures" as he had never even been to Asia, let alone India.

While of course the technological possibilities to gain information are better nowadays, this has not stopped larger powers and organizations creating more problems than they solved through partition and population transfers. While not a population transfer in the sense of partition, in the DRC, UN aid workers helped thousands of Hutus fleeing the Tutsis in the Rwandan Patriotic Front, thereby unknowingly encouraging their guerrilla forces to resume fighting knowing their population was in a safer place. It is not difficult to see how this scenario could happen again in a population transfer in the course of a partition, as a third power can simply never possess the inside knowledge needed to

prevent it. The only solution to this would be involving the groups fighting the civil war in the partition process, however as the very concept of partition is based on a third power leading it, this is unlikely to happen. This is an inherent problem in the practices of partition and population transfers, showing that they are not a plausible approach to peace due to having a high potential for such large-scale mistakes.

The case of Syria – testing the hypothesis in a current context

Finally, a critic of this article could argue that the points showing partitions and population transfers as not being plausible approaches to peace mainly use historical examples, making it less relevant. Therefore, in order to test if the hypothesis is valid today, a case study of partition as a solution to the Syrian civil war will be conducted, examining whether or not it is a plausible approach to peace in this scenario. Syria has been compared to Bosnia in light of this possibility, with many arguments pointing out that in Bosnia the Dayton Accords created long-lasting negative peace and ended the mass violence. In 2019 the retired US Navy Admiral James Stavridis proposed a partition scenario for Syria that envisioned creation of three regions with purpose to keep apart the main warring parties - the Alawites connected to Assad, the Sunni Muslims and the Kurds. He employed the argument of geographical separation as a last resort option as established by Kaufmann and discussed earlier. However, this idea did not address the root causes of the conflict, which cannot be found in a general inability of ethnic and religious groups to coexist, but in “unresponsive, exclusionary political institutions” and a highly brutal regime.

Further, this proposed partition into three regions disregarded all other religious minorities, such as the other Shia Muslims, showing large potential for ethnic cleansing or a genocide to occur as has been explained in earlier points. It disregards also Russian, Turkish and Iranian involvement in the war, who have been battling around the rebel stronghold of Idlib and other parts of the country in 2020, and whose interests as large international powers must also be considered in any lasting solution to the conflict. An even more significant problem with this partition however would be the potential of an international conflict with Turkey due to a proposed independent Kurdish state, stoking Turkish fears of uprisings from the Kurdish minority in Turkey. This is likely to lead to at least large-scale violence, if not a genocide to prevent an uprising, as Turkey “fears and loathes Kurdish independence anywhere in the world more than it fears and loathes anything else”, and is already essentially engaging in ethnic cleansing of Kurds in Syria, so can be assumed to have no issues with committing these atrocities in Turkey too.

Finally, the aspect of further violence during population transfers, without which the partition proposal would be impossible to achieve has to be explored. As in India and Pakistan, the movements of the population transfers are likely to result in the deaths of many people, the reasons for which can best be explained when consulting two maps.



Map of proposed Partition (left); Map of current divisions of territory (right)

When looking at these two maps, it can be seen that many people loyal to Assad living in government-controlled areas (beige) would have to be transferred into the small Alawite area (red), thereby crossing the current Kurdish territory (blue) and the then Sunni territory (pale red), showing a large potential for violence akin to that in India, especially with the government forces from the northeast (around Qamishli and Hasakah) that would have to travel a long distance. Further, the mostly Sunni rebel forces (pale red) would have to be moved, creating the same issues, and moving them away from the backing they receive from Turkey and the Turkish-controlled area in the north which is unlikely to be accepted by either them or Turkey. Finally, the Kurdish forces (blue) would also be put into a significantly smaller area, creating the potential for an uprising. However, there are not only practical concerns. So far, all the partition plans being championed have been proposed by Western citizens. There is not a proposal to be found by a Syrian citizen involved in the war, bringing up the moral and practical third-party-problem. Thus, while partition in Syria might be a last resort option to create some type of peace, it is in this case not a plausible approach as the human cost and suffering inflicted would be immense, the threat of Turkey starting an international war cannot be underestimated, and peace would not be long-lasting due to partition not addressing the root causes.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this article has hypothesized in the introduction that partitions and population transfers are not plausible approaches to peace, defining a plausible approach as something which can within reasonable limits to human suffering achieve peace, and has through analysis of key literature and own arguments verified that hypothesis. While it does acknowledge that partitions and population transfers are sometimes the only option left to end a conflict, this article does still not find them to be plausible simply because of the immense human suffering they inflict on a population, both in contexts of further outbreaks of violence and identity. It strongly supports the idea that the time of partitions and population transfers has come to an end, as the world has moved into an era of decolonized states and individual rights. Nonetheless and finally, this article disagrees with Kaufmann's notion of the inherent interconnectedness of partitions and population transfers. Throughout the arguments against them as a plausible approach for peace, it has been highlighted that the most intense human suffering often occurs in population transfers, therefore making them unacceptable, while formalizing partitions of heavily divided countries seems significantly less traumatic and morally wrong, showing it to be closer to a plausible approach to peace.

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Prevent as Control and Surveillance: A Critical Theory Review of the United Kingdom's Counter-radicalization Strategy in British Muslim Communities

Kristóf Vincze

The rise of Critical Terrorism Studies in the post-Cold War era has led to the changing of the Counter-terrorism (CT) landscape globally: underlying assumptions and truisms about the efficacy and morality of combatting terrorism have been challenged. This transformation in the academic world has left its mark on policy apparatuses, enabling a gradual softening of CT measures by going beyond military and policing measures. This occurred parallel to the securitization of social justice and wellbeing that were perceived as drivers of intrastate conflict; this is especially visible in the New Wars paradigm of the post-Cold War era. What has been seen since the early 1990s is the beginnings of a cross-discipline paradigm that shifted the focus from military confrontation between nation-states to smaller scale conflict and focuses on injustice, social tension and inequality as causes of violence. Such is the case in current-day Britain, as exemplified through the Prevent program, which engages in counter-radicalization – as opposed to de-radicalization, as is later discussed – to tackle terrorism, and thus serves as the subject of this paper. The government's strategy is examined on the basis of its engagement with Muslim communities to argue that it is flawed in key areas and as such, it is limited in its potential to be successful. This will be done by looking at the context and emergence of counter-radicalization policies, then Prevent's origins, goals, and methods. After that, Prevent's problems will be examined: its problematic engagement with Muslim communities, its excessive breach of privacy by, ironically, favoring policing and lastly, its consequent inability to produce results.

About the author

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Tackling Radicalization as a Tactic of Counter-terrorism

In the late 20th and early 21st century, academics of terrorism started to conceive of CT through lenses beyond hard power approaches based in security and intelligence (i.e., preventing terrorist plots and fighting already radicalized terrorists), giving attention to soft power approaches via looking at the causes of terrorism and the process of radicalization. Despite a sharp incline in military and surveillance-based CT tactics in the early 21st century, connected to 9/11 and the War on Terror, the up-and-coming paradigm pioneered by Critical Terrorism Studies has eventually and gradually been adopted by policymakers, hence the growing attention to preventing the radicalization of disillusioned individuals and rehabilitating those already radicalized. Indeed, by the 2010s, the costs and apparent lack of success of the War on Terror abroad and its outcome of alienating Muslims shifted the narrative to a more socially-minded approach to terrorism. In this context, policy circles have embraced the ideas of understanding the motives and perceived grievances of terrorists as a means to tackle radicalization; it is also this notion that led to abandoning the thought that doing the above meant endorsing or rationalizing terrorism, terrorists and their tactics.

Building on this, the British counter-radicalization attempt is situated in an intellectual framework, which looks at the causes of embracing terrorism and devises safeguards to prevent it, providing viable alternatives to militancy. Counter-radicalization must take place early on to dissuade would-be terrorists from committing to terrorism. Professor John Horgan of Georgia State University, a professor of psychology and an eminent authority on involvement and engagement in terrorism describes de-radicalization, as opposed to counter-radicalization, as "undoing the gradual, incrementally experienced process of social and behavioral learning," which he claims is improbable. It is explicitly a reactive measure, as opposed to counter-radicalization. Thus, it is an attempt to reverse, not prevent, the radicalizing process. Indeed, as many argue, de-radicalization is problematic exactly because of the need to completely renounce violence as a political tool in response to theological persuasion and material incentives (such as subsidies in employment and training), often only possible under peer pressure or following personal crises or trauma.

Note further Horgan's argument that de-radicalization is not rehabilitation; the latter refers to renouncing violence. He points to disengagement or the retaining of extremist views without the inclination for violence as a more appropriate term. Thus, radicalization is agreed to be a mostly irrevocable process, and its renunciation is a subject to a complete personal paradigm shift. This entails that preventing radicalization is a more conceivable alternative to attempting to undo it, avoiding a given possibility rather than having to engage and undo a particular certainty. It is in this background that national counter-radicalization measures have been widely employed in Europe, including Prevent strategy in the United Kingdom. Prevent, as will be shown, thus undertakes counter-radicalization in a program that aims to forego the occurrence of radicalization and consequently negate the threat of terrorism.

Components of the Prevent Strategy

In Europe, preventing the embrace of radicalism has been a focal point at the national level. The European Union (EU) response to 9/11 has been formative in shaping a mindset that promotes supranational legislation on policing measures and devolved legislation on counter-radicalization. This response was shaped by the fact that, as Raphael Bossong puts it, "member states would not accept more than an indirect supportive role for EU action." The EU attitude thus became that "inter-cultural dialogue and dialogue with religions," as well as the task of making Muslim communities feel accepted and comfortable within EU countries was to be carried out on the national level. Prevent emerges from the post-9/11 and 7/7 British counter-terrorism context, focused on counter-radicalization. A broader counter-terrorism strategy has been in place since 2003, which was rebranded and expanded in 2005 in the wake of the 7/7 bombings, becoming known as CONTEST. It is based on four main components - Pursue, Protect, Prepare and Prevent. Prevent attempts to curb radicalization and by extension the "risk of terrorism" via working with police, local governments and the private sector through undermining radical narratives and supporting people liable to be radicalized.

Its five strands aim to:

1. "counter radical Islamism and bolster those who espouse a moderate Islamic ideology" in co-operation with Islamic scholars, think tanks and NGOs,
2. "impede the efforts of those trying to radicalize others" by prosecuting perpetrators that engage in the above,
3. support "vulnerable individuals" by "mentoring programs and training opportunities for young Muslim leaders",
4. increase "local communities' resilience to violent extremism by strengthening moderate Muslim leaders and empowering young [Muslims]", and
5. "address grievances that extremists use to mobilize support by reducing discrimination and inequality."

In its current rendition, the grander CONTEST strategy and Prevent target "the full spectrum of extremism: violent and non-violent, Islamist and neo-Nazi", albeit with a central focus on radical Islam or Islamism. The stress on Islamism is influenced by budding radicalism in the growing European Muslim diaspora, riddled with alienation, concentration "in ethnic enclaves," and lack of education and employment prospects. Thus, Prevent addresses the "inadequate economic, social, and political participation; high unemployment rates; criminality; urban fragmentation; and other social ills" and attempts to promote trust in the diaspora in opposition to intelligence and security measures. The strategy is intended to be flexible in order to be specified and carried out through co-operation with local councils and Muslim communities. Locality is crucial due to particularized cultural patterns affecting individuals' identity and, by extension, the way they are influenced. Some of the activities include discussions on radicalism, arts and cultural events, sports and recreation.

Additionally, Prevent is also carried out in prisons, seen as hubs for radicalization. One such Prevent project is the Quilliam Foundation, which "carries out research, training, and outreach activities to advance its agenda of providing an alternative to Islamism and encouraging Islamists to return to mainstream Islam." Its work has influenced the language of CONTEST to improve its appeal; it provided a defense of religion in the wake of Islamophobia in Britain, it held discussions on British-Muslim relations with different social groups, it fostered Muslim political participation, media projects, and community events. It is therefore apparent that Prevent is a strategy of soft power, influenced by the post-Cold War approach to resolving violence, using persuasion and dissuasion through civil society to tackle radicalism in the British Muslim diaspora. It is rested on the securitization of British Muslims' wellbeing, correlating insufficient employment, discrimination, and various forms of injustice with the propensity to become radicalized. Admittedly, it has a broad scope in terms of actions and target audience (going beyond British Muslims) and is conceived through notions of social justice, community cohesion and dialogue as drivers of counter-radicalization.

Prevent's tensions with British Muslim communities

Prevent has been problematized by Muslim communities and various human rights advocacies that see its work as emerging from the labelling of Islam as inherently dangerous and conceiving Muslim communities as hotbeds of radicalization. Prevent's alleged tendency to target Muslims is exemplified by statistics such that referrals in 2017-18 tied to Islamism made up 44% of all referrals, according to the Home Office; however, this number was closer to 75% in 2017, according to the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, meaning, "a Muslim in the UK is 50 times more likely to be referred to Prevent than a non-Muslim," as put forward by Asim Qureshi of CAGE. In addition, 40% of those arrested for terrorism-related offences between 2001-2016 were of "Asian appearance" (41% in 2017) and 46% of those arrested for terrorism-related offences had declared themselves as Muslim.

What is therefore apparent is that Muslims garner a lot of attention from Prevent. At this point, one can argue that Prevent is not evenly focused between populations and, as Qureshi again argues, a minority of the population is subject to scrutiny from a CT framework. He posits that this could merely be a result of Muslims being more at risk of radicalization or, conversely, a negative and arbitrary conceptualization of Muslims being more prone to be radical. The latter case can thus be seen as the securitization of Muslim communities. The distinction can thus be drawn in terms of responding to the fact of Muslims, in a *nigh-Huntingtonian* manner, being just more likely to resort to terrorism, versus Muslims being portrayed as such without real evidence, thus invoking excessive attention and attempts to mitigate the perceived radicalism. In this case, it can be argued that proneness to radicalization would be either a genuine reason for the disproportionate attention by Prevent, or the securitization of Muslim communities could best be seen as a manufactured reason.

Whether genuine or manufactured, Prevent's disproportionate attention to Muslim communities reflects a troubling set of attitudes. A genuine reason would indicate either a Huntingtonian civilizational clash, such that the Muslim faith is irreconcilable with the prevailing Liberal values of Britain, or one implying that reigning British policies – and Britain's presence in the Middle East – have marginalized British Muslim communities to an extent that radicalism is seen as a viable solution. As is discussed below, measures such as extensive policing, intelligence collection and the creation of suspect communities have caused grief for Muslim communities. However, the argument here is not that this increases the likelihood of becoming radicalized but that this is the failure of Prevent to reach out to communities effectively and as equal partners. If Prevent worked as intended, the high rate of Muslims arrested in terrorism-related offences would have troubling implications for how relevant it is as a CT tactic. Tying into the manufactured reasons then, Prevent has already been discussed as a means of securitization. Actors engaged in the Prevent program look to Muslim communities in a Huntingtonian manner, seeing them as bound to be radicalized, given the circumstances, hence the number of referrals and arrests only serves to reinforce this prevailing mindset. This speaks to the implied characterization of Muslims refraining from radicalism so long as they are not marginalized but having no qualms about using violence as a tool once such issues arise.

Thus, there is a reductive characterization at play – the extent of this further illuminated by the reference to "Asian appearance" in the arrest statistics earlier. An othering of British Muslims thus reproduces what Edward Said calls Orientalism. The mere fact that these communities are examined as such showcases Orientalist reductionism through the conceptualization of communities and their key characteristics, down to the personal level, through Islam. This simplification is a reaction to the existence of an Other and the creation of a dialectic of binary opposition. The binary opposition entails threat, which invokes the need to subdue and manage it. Whilst Said's work looks at colonial relations primarily, and it would be certainly extreme to imply that Prevent works as a form of neo-colonial management, it is undoubtedly apparent management takes place through the framework of reductionism, polarization and asymmetric power relations in the Prevent strategy.

Indeed, as Charlotte Heath-Kelly argues, Prevent facilitates the creation of suspect communities – communities that are both part of the cause and solution of radicalization. This relies on the conflation of risk and vulnerability, through the securitization of indicators showing issues within the community or between the community and the greater society – despite the prevailing wisdom of relying on grassroots, community-based solutions. Hence the conceptualization of these communities through dual roles in the CT framework, working for and against the Prevent program – here the phenomenon of suspect communities evokes questions about control, surveillance, and efficacy. The outset for this is Heath-Kelly's point that Prevent acts as a control measure within the CT framework. It is intended to be perceived as an intellectual exercise reigning radicalization in via its knowledge of the subject, and, presumably, of the affected communities. It is noteworthy that specific communities are designated as affected and their members'

radicalization managed through a control framework proclaiming superior knowledge of the subject – rather evocative of colonial management. Beyond critiquing the premise under which control is exerted, looking at how it is exerted can highlight particular issues. Anastassia Tsoukala joins Heath-Kelly in arguing that control is exercised in a Foucauldian manner, as "social (…) control at a distance" via surveillance and screening. The tactic of control as surveillance is also emphasized by Qureshi, who sees this as nested in a "larger judicial and security atmosphere", with Prevent acting as an unofficial intelligence-gathering exercise. He emphasizes the point that authorities' active encouragement of referring "friends, colleagues, family members and neighbors to Prevent if they behave suspiciously (…) creates an environment of distrust within communities, and leads to a high number of baseless, unnecessary and traumatizing referrals." This narrative then shows Prevent not only recreating the rift between the authorities and suspect communities but also the active polarization of these communities themselves from within. As such, the suspect communities approach promotes polarization on the communal level instead of strengthening said communities and promoting communal resilience. Not only is this converse to the articulated goals of Prevent, but the breakdown of communal integrity directly undermines communal outreach attempts aimed at individuals perceived to be at risk. Moreover, the fact of surveillance used in the Foucauldian manner is an alarming indication of pervasive control encouraging self-policing and the internalization of control.

Whilst Qureshi's account itself might not be definitive, concern over the level of surveillance – especially as opposed to community-building – in Prevent has been widely expressed. This includes the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Freedom of Assembly's perception of and concern over an Orwellian level of surveillance that influences what is deemed suspicious in a public discussion. This again, emphasizes how implicit assumptions about what is radical, and who can be trusted, are shaped under the presumption of continuous surveillance. Prevent's normative context is then shaped by a disregard of privacy expressed through surveillance and, presumably, intelligence-gathering, from which emerges a regimen of indirect control. Even though the UK is far from being a dystopian regime, the above execution of counter-radicalization measures undermines human rights and normalizes social control. In relating to the civilian populace, the Prevent framework adheres to a normative standpoint in which rights are not constants but variables in an equation, to be sacrificed for the benefit of security.

As Tsoukala puts it, Prevent "relies on the assumption that the value of human rights is equal but opposed to that of security." Whilst this is part of a greater debate on the nature of the balance between freedom and security, what is evident is that the way Prevent interprets this debate penalizes freedom, hence reasserting the righteousness and normative value of actions aimed at communities perceived to be at risk. As already established, current policies unfairly target, scrutinize, and polarize British Muslim communities. With that in mind, conceiving of surveillance as integral to security then invokes questions about not only the nature and extent of Liberal democracy but about the supposed equality of the citizens of the state. Thus, the conditions for the creation of

divisions, stigmas and alienation affecting British Muslim communities are met under Prevent's misguided framework. The way Prevent manifests suspect communities out of British Muslim communities warrants a range of normative concerns about underlying assumptions of radicalization, managing risks, policing and social justice – beyond the morality of this process lay questions about normative issues affecting practice. The above criticisms are structural and relate to the nature of Prevent and the implicit truisms affecting its rationale, but in doing so, they expose underlying tensions and contradictions and hint at immaterial factors affecting the success at which the program can be implemented and be made to operate.

Efficacy

As a government policy, Prevent has the core responsibility of preventing individuals at risk from becoming radicalized, thus working towards a larger CT goal established through CONTEST. As established above, normative issues that give Prevent its controversial nature compromise its credibility and image in the eyes of British Muslim communities. The critical contention here is that Prevent cannot function effectively because of how it interacts with British Muslim communities. As such, its implementation and result ought to represent this contention. On the level of implementation, a considerable deficiency is evident. This includes the largely superficial application of community partnerships, the absence of grassroots input concerning localized Prevent programs or how they are adopted, mosques' failure to meaningfully engage Islamism, and the absence of Prevent-funded risk assessments in higher education, despite it being a hotbed of radicalization. On the one hand, it can be argued that implementation issues are caused by institutional, structural or bureaucratic difficulties, making the delivering of local partnerships difficult.

On the other, the factors highlighted above hint at a lack of willingness to help deliver and implement a program that creates suspects out of the community it is meant to assist and the assistance on which it relies on. Note how in 2016, the National Police Chiefs' Council showed less than 10 percent of referrals from within the British Muslim communities, whilst calls for boycotting Prevent were made by the Birmingham Central Mosque and the Waltham Forest Council of Mosques in London, quoting racism and profiling as their reason. Communities' reluctance to work with Prevent lie with the reasons identified above. Yasmine Ahmed, Director of Human Rights Watch UK, has expressed her concerns, saying that "Prevent has alienated and marginalized the community who are now mistrustful of the security apparatus that needs them to work with them", whilst Miqdaad Versi, Assistant Secretary-General of the Muslim Council of Britain emphasized issues of accountability, saying "If you have a strategy it should have the appropriate controls to see if it is effective. It is standard practice. That is a core part of our concern." It is essential to distinguish this from the Huntingtonian argument; the lack of co-operation is not a product of civilizational divides but rather a reaction to the discriminatory attitudes. Prevent fails spectacularly from this aspect: despite its inception as a soft power strategy, attempting to strengthen and integrate communities through social action and

empowerment, its strategies dissuade British Muslims from relying on Prevent due to its preference to manage, mitigate, monitor and control communities in a top-down manner, achieving the opposite of intended results. Prevent cannot afford to be divisive and controversial, crucially in the eyes of the community it seeks to engage with the most.

Considering the above failure in implementing Prevent and engaging British Muslim communities, its operational inefficiency comes into light. In 2017-8, of the 7318 referred people, only 42% "left the process requiring no further action," and between 2012-6, around 800 British citizens have joined ISIL, and another 600 have been captured attempting to. The London Bridge, Manchester and Westminster attacks have also generated criticism against Prevent. Certainties cannot be identified from these occurrences. As Bossong argues, the issue is that evaluating counter-radicalization's degree of success might not be feasible; its success is hard to evaluate, and the non-occurrence of terrorism cannot be attributed to a given element due to the number of variables, hence rendering policy evaluation near impossible. What can, however, be seen is that Prevent is reportedly loosely implemented and met with hostility by the British Muslim communities it targets. Criticism by said communities coincides with the normative failings of Prevent, as identified in this paper. The statistics in this paragraph cannot be directly attributed to the poor implementation of Prevent or the issues that have been identified, but their coexistence should raise concerns, enabling approaches in which Critical Theory can detect linkages between the implicit values and views constructing policy, and the manners in which policy is implemented and the results it produces.

Conclusion

In response to claims of Islamophobia, Home Office statistics showed no substantial disparity between Muslims and other groups "in the proportions charged, sentence length or seriousness of offence." What is apparent from the Home Office response is that Prevent is not explicitly discriminatory – while this might be true and it can be assumed that the intentions behind Prevent are not governed by bigotry or malice, it still fails to live up to standards of inclusion, equality, and justice in its attempt to undercut radicalization processes. This is a crucial strategic failing when claims of Prevent profiling Muslims play into Islamists' hands in discrediting it. Prevent attempts to resolve the issue of radicalization through a post-Cold War framework, perceiving itself to be a soft approach, whilst failing to exercise the softness it ascribes to and recreating unequal and discriminatory power relations and securitizing communities instead of enabling them. Sufficient attempts to enable British Muslim communities must come from a clear understanding of Prevent's current problems, including the *Saidian* management of the Other, the creation and stigmatization of suspect communities, Foucauldian policing and oversight, and limited grassroots engagement.

Alex Peter Schmid asserts that under the notions of good governance, democracy, the rule of law and social justice, Muslims can be dissuaded from engaging in militant

Islamism by addressing socio-economic and political grievances, widening participation, establishing a common value base, maintaining the right to the freedom of expression and utilizing media outlets to increase outreach. This can hardly be contested – however, this must also include a look at the way Prevent conceives the Muslim diaspora in the UK and how it addresses underlying assumptions about radicalism and the Other. Ultimately, Prevent already claims to work towards the goals identified by Schmid, yet it is diluted, side-tracked, and compromised by its emergent intention to manage the supposedly at-risk community through surveillance and control measures. Therefore, the road towards addressing Prevent's issues must look to a genuine softening of the approach, prioritizing counter-radicalization through dialogue and renouncing management, referrals, and information gathering. This change can only occur when norms, values, and goals align in favor of counter-radicalization instead of the above alternatives on an institutional level, facilitating reforms and re-structuring in the larger CT framework and within Prevent. Whether this is possible on normative grounds is uncertain, however, without reform of a similar nature, what is certain is that Prevent will fail to support or be supported by British Muslim communities, recreating the concerns about its efficacy and validity as a tool of counter-radicalization.

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The Violence of Development: Analysis of the Relation between Capitalist Development and Violence

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This study aims to deconstruct the common understanding of development as an effective tool to reduce violence. To do so, it portrays development as a political process encompassing more subtle forms of violence. More specifically, due to the limitations of the research, it concentrates only on the role of 'primitive accumulation' in capitalist development, demonstrating how it inspires social through profit maximization. The article begins with a discussion on the conceptualization of development to contextualize the problem and underline the importance of addressing it. Subsequently, the text briefly explains that for the purposes of this essay violence is understood as a form of political practice dependent on any particular social transformation. Having built the theoretical and conceptual bases, the article continues with an analysis of the violent practices of development. The key findings show how these are installed through the determination of certain social property relations, eternalizing, and normalizing the so-called 'primitive accumulation.' In other words, the valorization of social norms, the exclusion of some social groups, and the consolidation of class indifferences have become the facilitating processes for continuous profit maximization. The violent nature of these processes has been justified by the state using the law as a way of maintaining social property relations. It became clear that development is a representation of how power is exercised to legitimize the use of force for specific gains. The article contributes to the broader debate about the role of development and its perils by illuminating the inherently violent nature of some capitalist processes. More specifically, the research outcomes could be implemented in the efforts towards the re-conceptualization and re-shaping of the development project to foster a more comprehensive and inclusive approach to international development.

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Introduction

> *"[W]e deplore violence and wish to restrain it, we applaud justice and wish to promote it, and are confused about the relation between what we deplore and what we applaud."*

Development is often assumed to bring values like democracy, human rights, economic prosperity aiming to protect people against "violence". There is the consensus that the process reduces violence; meaning the more developed a country is, the less violent it will be. However, as the quote above well suggests, the line between justice and violence is thin. In its current practice development has determined what the concept looks like (e.g., poverty, conflict, war, terrorism), constructing a narrow understanding of its different forms. This discourse frames it as an effective tool to resolve violence which is problematic because as a political process development itself encompasses more subtle violent structures. Hence, failing to recognize and tackle the hidden constructions of violence poses a significant risk for people's political and social freedoms.

This paper aims to challenge the assumption that development is an effective tool to reduce violence because development itself is founded on violence. It does so by, firstly, engaging critically with some of the misconceptions of development to highlight how framing it as the 'highest good' in society constructs a problematic conceptualization of violence. Having portrayed the fundamental Eurocentric narratives underlying the idea of development, we then briefly discuss how the concept should be approached for the purposes of this paper by outlining its politicized nature dependent on particular social transformations. Finally, the article presents how violence is constitutive of development by analyzing the role of 'primitive accumulation' in capitalist advancement. It demonstrates how development promotes capitalist social transformation for the maximization of profit. The critical literature has investigated gender violence of development, resource exploitation, colonial violence, capitalist extraction, and structural racism. These forms are all valid to engage with to get a better image of how capitalist development installs and enforces violence. However, to achieve depth over breadth, we solely engage with state power imposition through primitive accumulation and large-scale dispossessions. It is essential to focus on 'primitive accumulation' as this is the initial trigger for social transformation, later fostering more violence. The following analysis aims to highlight some of the problems in the discipline; however, this should not be seen as a complete representation of the field as it has, indeed, brought about positive outcomes for people around the world. Nevertheless, it is crucial that we address the ontological characteristics of development to scrutinize its shortcomings and practical implications as a way of opening the door for 're-forming' the field.

Development as "everyman's road to utopia"

Development comes in many shapes and forms depending on the lenses we choose to look at it through because our positionality derives from a specific cultural and political background. The literature offers a spectrum of equally valid interpretations starting from economic growth and poverty reduction going through foreign aid and democratization to being about gender equality and environmental protection. However, there is a general trend of development being intrinsically associated with the good; it is framed as something desirable, positive, and progressive. As Heinz Arndt puts it 'development… appears to have come to encompass almost all facets of the good society, everyman's road to utopia.' Amartya Sen provides a good example of how, from its inception, it is constructed positively. His broader definition of the concept as freedom where freedom is both "means and an end to development" frame it as a tool empowering people through processes and opportunities. Simply put, development and democratic values are presented as mutually supportive and reinforcing. Thus, more development implies a higher level of democracy, and democracies could better enforce "successful development".

Deriving his analysis partially from the Aristotelian logic of life quality and capacity as well as Adam Smith's analysis of "necessities" and conditions of living, Sen falls into the perils of Eurocentrism. Even though he pursues a broader view of development, he still uses well-established images of democratic engagement and market logic. He fails to recognize the structural and institutional inequalities present in society as he does not explore how "the concentration of economic power and diffusing culture" might influence what individuals consider as valuable. The five instruments of freedom he lists aim to demonstrate how when political freedom, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, and protective security are available, people can exercise their human potential, and by extension development. However, his capability theory comes short of strong conceptualization of capabilities. Particularly, it is unclear what capabilities are to be prioritized, what are their relationships and how individual freedoms are to be regulated in the name of the common social justice. Bringing the discussion to an individualistic level deprives Sen's analysis from the complexity multidimensional structures like language, politics, and communal values introduce for determining how freedoms are to be exercised and formed.

Moving back to the contemporary understanding of development, we could see how the goals of Sen's human-centric approach have been widely implemented by Western actors. For example, international and national organizations have allowed for dominant actors to shape their politics and activities letting Eurocentric socio-political power dynamics to prevail and characterize development work. The reason behind this process lies in the governance structure of international organizations facing "the challenge of

meaningful inclusion for all stake-holders". More specifically, despite some slight improvements, developing countries and civil societies have been limited in their ability to shape negotiations and influence policy-making. These actors are legally recognized and can participate in negotiations at international level through a diplomatic representative. However, there are more subtle barriers to active participation - not incorporated in the governing system of international organizations - inevitably leading to disenfranchisement.

Firstly, in developing countries, the endogenous factors, referring to the conditions categorizing the nation from within, are not as developed as in the West. For instance, such factors are human resources: people's qualification, training and knowledge, state stability, and command of English. Furthermore, transnational connectivity plays an important role in international decision-making as it incorporates access to a wider network, gaining knowledge about science and policy, and building connections. These preliminary conditions are far more advanced and utilized by the Western actors, so with primarily Western state representatives in international organizations' governance, an account of such barriers has not been taken into consideration. Thus, developing states are limited in their ability to participate and influence policy and decision-making. Subsequently, if their experiences and position are not acknowledged in the voted programs and initiatives, then these will not be effective in achieving the set goals. This shows how the positive framing of development has been widely implemented by Western actors feeding Eurocentric values and knowledge into multicultural and transnational processes.

This is highly problematic because it blurs the complexity of historical and contextual dispositions of democracy and development; shaped by given place and time. Hence, enforcing the Western (neo)liberal forms as determents of these processes narrows the conceptual meaning the two ideas have, and thus, undermines the distinctive variants other societies extend as an understanding of them. Moreover, by reducing the alternatives available to the Western logic, this approach frames the West as being the promoter of democracy and development. Consequently, this narrative could be used to legitimize Western practices that might be controversial and problematic.

For example, the European Union's and the U.S.'s initiatives in the Central Asian (CAS) region clearly portray the biased approach Western actors undertake towards the aims and goals of international advancement. The case study of CAS shows how the concept is used as a tool for maintaining the international and national security where foreign aid was invested in military troops, or given solely for security-related issues. Rather than operating with citizenry and civil society, they remained within the local paradigm engaging with the CAS regimes, justifying human rights abuses and oppression. In 2011, the U.S. government reversed the 2003 restrictions on foreign aid to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan aimed at improving the conditions of human rights in order to pursue its security goals. This portrays the narrative built by global actors – development as a violence-reducing tool, enforcing security. The United Nations (UN) former Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, clearly suggests that when saying: "The human family will not enjoy development without security, will not enjoy security without development." Furthermore, the UN 2030 Agenda

for Sustainable Development articulates this relationship even more clearly where development serves “to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime (emphasis added).” To sum up, limiting our conception of violence to specific forms derived from a Eurocentric perspective poses the risk of dismissing its other shapes such as the imposition of capitalist logic in social relations. The following analysis aims to show that development is not an effective tool to reduce violence because its foundations are based on such structures. Before doing this, the paper briefly introduces the ongoing debate on violence to shed light on the contestation of the concept and how the analysis fits in and contributes to the broader discussion.

The political act of conceptualizing violence

The World Health Organization’s definition of violence as the use of physical force is what has come to become a general understanding of the concept:

> *“…the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, mal-development or deprivation.”*

However, the concept cannot be simply limited to the visible forms of force, causing harm to individuals, but should also include other expressions of it. Johan Galtung's idea of structural violence show how pre-set power dynamics create inequalities. Ellen Wood also identifies competition, profit maximization, and capital accumulation as the imperatives formed by the capitalist market system; inevitably forcing society into specific social property relations. Similarly, Robert Brenner explains capitalist nature through a model of agency within structural constraints. However, what these approaches omit is the agency of the decision-makers who construct and shape the system. The conceptualization of violence should consider agency as a factor - moving the focus on its 'implicit subjectivity'. Put differently, while seeing violence as a system gives a useful perspective on understanding the nature and implications of the concept, this should be done in pair with an agency-orientated approach. Agency and structure are both self-enforcing and self-constraining; and it is through their interaction that processes occur. Thus, it is not enough to look at how violence exists as a structure, but also as a human action because it is people who drive international organizations and lead the decision-making. By acknowledging that these higher decision-making positions are, firstly, given to certain individuals over others, and then, that these individuals’ decisions derive from their experiences and background - we create space for further analysis on how individual agency reinforces or challenges current structures.

The visibility of some forms of violence is the political determinant for generating a vision of what categorizes as imposing a state of fear and insecurity. Thus, ignoring other types of it`s a political choice enhancing certain narratives and disempowering others. Conceptualizing violence is an act of power used to justify the use of force for specific objectives. This claim contradicts Hannah Arendt's distinction between power and violence where the latter occurs when "real" power is not present. However, Arendt's attempt to challenge the realist perspective on the 'political' to frame the concept as non-political comes short in explaining its formation and enforcement. The following analysis frames it as a form of political practice dependent on any particular social transformations. This is not to accept the realist understanding of political being a form of domination, but to enforce a critical multilateral approach to addressing violence and its relation to development.

Analysis of "The Normalized Quiet of Unseen Power"

Development is seen as a capitalist project generating certain economic relations to accommodate economic growth and global advancement. The capitalist agenda behind this process is evident in the social transformations taking place such as an extensive focus on the state as a regulatory body, institutionalization of market forces like profit maximization and competition, and the valorization of social norms. The profit-making logic of capitalism commodifies and objectifies social relations which constructs a value system relying on indifference to develop. As Marx puts it, capitalism is asserted through the so-called primitive accumulation as for capitalism to break through there is the need for initial capital for making a profit. However, the accumulation of wealth should not be reviewed only as a process from a pre-capitalist period accommodating the transition from a feudalist form of production to a capitalist. Instead, it is through this process that social relations are being continuously transformed to facilitate the conditions for making a profit. More specifically, the class indifferences revolving around property ownership determine the inclusion and exclusion of certain social group from the capitalist market. Hence, violence materializes through such institutional and discursive practices.

What this means is that development, as a spatio-cultural project of the West, transforms social relations as reliant on commodity. People's labor becomes commodity itself, and land as a mode of production incentivize a continuous struggle for capital. The logic of the market dominates all facets of life through the creation of spaces of inclusion and exclusion; undermining cultural, historical, and personal values and experiences. While Marx disagrees that every capitalist is evil, capitalism does indeed place profit over welfare. The primitive accumulation, necessary for capitalism to break through completely, requires the displacement of people from rural areas to the cities, or from the periphery to the center. Having lost their land, people are forced into becoming proletarians working for capitalists. The process of physically depriving individuals of their land and forcing them into a struggle for capital by imposing certain social property relations on them is

itself a form of violence. Subsequently, these violent practices are further enforced to maintain class consolidation.

Capitalism and imperialism are intricately linked to the development project; the externalization of the capitalist logic upon the rest of the world - only possible through Western imperialism. To put this into the contemporary context, while international organizations stand for democratic values of peaceful coexistence and autonomy, there are still three million internally displaced people and poor rural communities in Colombia excluded from the social space. The Colombian government along with the support of the World Bank has been promoting labor contracts with corporations where 'co-operatives' of workers are pushed to bid for contracts whilst paying for the cost of equipment, insurances, taxes, etc. Aiming to reduce cost, these policies created a new environment for the unemployed in the country forcing them into the outskirts of the cities where they become vulnerable to police, military and paramilitary violence. This is what Walter Rodney also touches on in his historical approach to explaining how Europe underdeveloped Africa. In his presentation of development as a process resulting from the "maximum use of the country's labor and natural resources," Rodney draws examples of slavery and coerced labor. These processes deprived Africans of effectively engaging with agriculture and industry as at the same time imposed on them certain social property relations. Marx argues that the introduction of capitalism in Afro-Asia was needed to be done through Western imperialism due to the stagnated and backward nature of their society where no class struggle could occur otherwise. However, Rodney categorically disagrees with this premise as concepts like nationalism, for example, already existed in the greater African community just manifested under the more general idea of unity and a common goal. Thus, the imposition of capitalism was in no way equal as what is more, it led to Africa missing its opportunity to develop.

The complex nod of development starts to untie under the contribution of Rodney, whose work brings in the idea that it is not only the physical violence imposed through the colonialist imperative (e.g., slavery) the African population experienced. But also, the structural imbalances of capitalism demanding the exploitation and enforcement of social inequalities. Europe underdeveloped Africa by taking away its young and productive labor power leaving the land uncultivated, and thus, rewinding years of land work and stagnating future progress. This combined with the enforced dependencies on cheap European imports, intensive raw resources extraction and monopolization of local economic systems deprived Africa of the chance to develop. Instead, it grew to be a tool for Europe to stir its economic rise. While slavery involved colonizers continuously enforcing physical violence on the local population and intra-communal conflicts caused by strive for survival. The long-term consequences of this imperial capitalist expansion were the establishment and internalization of violence in Africa's development.

Harvey's work also sheds light on the understanding of 'accumulation by dispossession' as a key characteristic of capitalism which he achieves through the review of privatization and corporatization of public assets. In these terms, Glen Coulthard questions the conventional perception of land by introducing the idea of land being a "system of

reciprocal relations and obligations." Land cannot be only seen as a material property to be privatized but as an incentive for social struggle fostered by the state and capital practices of violence, dispossession and enclosure. Through these lenses, the advancement of indigenous people and nations in the Americas builds a picture of disruption, dislocation and elimination accompanied by the imposition and reproduction of governance systems and forms of life creating social imbalances for stimulating profit-maximization. What this implies is that development encompasses a structure build on violence because it enforces these violent practices through specific struggles. For instance, the political struggles of indigenous people in Canada who are further subjected to colonial practices through the politics of recognition. Coulthard has well described how the liberal orthodox conception of recognition is in fact a way of better 'accommodating' the distinctive needs of Indigenous people. However, this presumption generates a profoundly misrecognition of Indigenous demands and rights as it assumes recognition is something to be given by the government – as such it reinforces its sovereignty consolidating the violence of colonial dispossession and disempowerment. Thus, primitive accumulation is not, as Marx thought, a precondition for capitalism to emerge but its permanent characteristic. The 'accumulation by dispossession' allows us to reveal the violent practices constituting development for achieving capital accumulation; and existing through time via the implemented social property relations.

The state plays a vital role in the institutionalization of these violent practices through the establishment of law. Law is situated as a regulator of order; closely linked to the idea of violence existing outside of the law. Thus, the legitimacy of law comes from its ability to deal with the problem in a fair and just way. Put differently, to have law, there is the preliminary need for violence which must be maintained. Through this narrative, the state can use law as a legitimate tool; meaning any internal violent act performed by the state for regulating external expressions of violence can be justified. More accurately, the law is the actual realization of violence as it in fact legitimizes property violence; hence, sustains the above-discussed inequalities. In the case of Rwanda, the state undertakes authoritarian and coercive practices, justified through the presumed ability of the state to act in favor of its people. Rwanda has been showing significant economic growth in the last two decades. It has become an example of how development as a peace project enforces social identities which are less likely to cause violence. While much has been said about the human rights violations of the post-genocide government of Rwanda, to make a full understanding of the concept as founded on violence we need to look deeper in the agrarian transition in the country. Even though capitalist dynamics in the countryside are highly contested in the literature, there is a consensus over the state gaining from the peasants' labor, the creation of a landless class, and expansion of commercial farming.

In Rwanda, social property relations are justified by the idea of creating strong national identities aiming to hide the ethnic differences dominating the country's 'physically' violent past. Graham Harrison rightfully poses the challenge to the ones, who want to criticize the current Government of Rwanda, to provide a real alternative for decreases poverty and improving social well-being. However, the inability to find a realistic solution to the

multidimensional problems in Rwanda is not to suggest that this form of development does not contain forms of violence. In fact, it makes it clearer how challenging it is to address this process accommodated by the white liberal coat of development. Thus, in response to Harrison, while development is said to deal with complex socio-economic, political, and cultural problems, this should not serve as a legitimate reason for the utilization of inherently violent practices. What we witness in Rwanda is a consolidation of a military elite's power and class formation feeding the expansion of markets. Put differently, the case of Rwanda represents how capitalist expansion fosters certain social transformations normalizing and justifying violent forms of life.

Conclusion

This paper argued that development in its current shapes and forms cannot be considered as an effective tool to decrease violence because as a political process, it is itself founded on certain forms of violence. By challenging the Eurocentric colonial conceptualization of development and violence, the article analyzed the social transformation enforced by the capitalist logic of profit maximization and competition. The developed narrow focus on 'accumulation by dispossession' laid the foundations for understanding the nature of capitalist progress. The text described how the violence of development is installed through the determination of certain social property relations, which eternalize and normalize the so-called 'primitive accumulation.' In other words, the valorization of social norms, the exclusion of some social groups, and the consolidation of class indifferences have become the facilitating process for continuous profit maximization. The inherently violent nature of these processes has been justified by the state using law as a way of maintaining social property relations. It became clear that development is a representation of how power is exercised to legitimize the use of force for specific gains. The findings of this article contribute to the broader debate about the role of development and its perils by illuminating the inherently violent nature of capitalism. More specifically, they could be implemented in the efforts towards the re-conceptualization and re-shaping of the development project to foster a more comprehensive and inclusive approach. They also serve to "applaud justice and…promote it" for those whose experiences have been marginalized under the violent practices of development. An important question that arises from the analysis on the violence of development is about the pluralistic and distinct meanings of the concept, and weather instead of adding more nuances to it, we should discuss how and why different authors use it or avoid it. Further insights into this matter would be vital for the broader debate on violence but also particularly beneficial for the understanding of development practices.

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